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Abstract
Current policies leveraging financial incentives and improved irrigation efficiency to mitigate
groundwater scarcity have not proven to curtail trends of resource depletion. Groundwater
benefits cannot be appropriately valued solely on market forces, and so deeper policy
consideration is warranted under a framework that considers the importance of groundwater
across all its values to society. Understanding time preferences for groundwater management
and preferences for alternative policies is vital to inform efficient policies. Furthermore, climate
change remains politically controversial yet has important consequences for critical groundwater
resources and their sustainable long-term management. Proliferating policy narratives
concerning climate change could influence the way people think about managing groundwater
resources. I present three empirical studies that address these issues. Chapter I examines
irrigation efficiency technologies for improved outcomes using a market-based, spatiallydynamic optimization model to test the limitations of improvements alone and in tandem with
typical environmental policy mechanisms. Improved efficiency induces some producers to plant
more of water-intensive crops such as rice, and best-case improvements fail to counter trends of
groundwater depletion over a 30-year horizon. Chapter II elicits public willingness to pay
(WTP) for long-term groundwater management and for market and non-market groundwater
services. I employ time-discounted choice models to endogenously estimate time preferences
under different forms of discounting. This is the first non-market valuation to estimate
heterogeneity in time preferences using flexible mixing distributions. I find significant WTP for
water quality provision, buffer against long-term drought, jobs from agriculture, and provision of
wildlife habitat that promotes fishing and duck hunting, while most people display evidence of
hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Individual parameter distributions for WTP and

time preferences are not normally distributed. Chapter III continues the Narrative Policy
Framework (NPF) tradition to test for systematic influences of narrative frames about climate
change on elicited groundwater and policy preferences. In a Choice Experiment (CE), some
respondents were exposed to a structuralist, culturally-biased narrative frame about climate
change and groundwater resources. Using theories about cultural risk perception and motivated
reasoning for systematic evaluation, I find evidence for a cultural incongruency effect but no
evidence for a congruency effect. This suggests that people could respond more strongly to
incongruence than to congruence in the case of groundwater policy preferences.
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Introduction
Current policies to mitigate groundwater scarcity mostly involve voluntary incentive
programs that target agricultural users because they hold long-term financial interests linked to
groundwater availability. However, aquifer depletion continues and even accelerates in many
agricultural production regions despite current management efforts (Konikow, 2015; Schaible
and Aillery, 2012), warranting deeper policy consideration. Efficient policies consider values to
society rather than only to the marketplace. The benefits of groundwater cannot be appropriately
valued solely on market forces, and a better framework considers the importance of groundwater
across all of its values to society. Frameworks for valuing natural resource benefits would also
profit by considering the potential differences in valuation that might arise under alternative
policy contexts, because circumstances influence the value people ascribe to a good or service.
One critical issue that is likely to be germane to any potential environmental policy
context is global climate change. The climate change issue remains politically controversial in
the United States (US) yet has important consequences for critical groundwater resources and
their sustainable long-term management. In confluence with this fact, proliferation of policy
narratives concerning climate change could meaningfully influence the way people think about
managing groundwater resources.
Another issue that is present across environmental policy debates is how to discount
future benefits and costs associated with environmental resources and their management. The
use of differently sized discount rates in policy analyses can lead to the estimation of drastically
different net present values, and there is limited evidence about the magnitude and nature of time
preferences within groundwater or other policy contexts. Debates continue as to whether people
discount future values equally near the present and far in the future, or whether they exhibit time-
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dynamic discounting with rates that decline over time. Like the magnitude of the discount rate,
the selection of functional forms for discounting future values in policy analyses could influence
the size of estimated present values. This, in turn, may determine whether or not to implement
potential policy alternatives.
I present three separate empirical studies related to groundwater management policy that
examine details about the issues presented above. These articles contribute to three very
different bodies of literature, but are linked in their associations to the benefit-cost framework
with the recognition that physical and social realities of groundwater resources management
inherently force tradeoffs between (and among) benefits and costs and place them to be central
factors in both evaluating policies and understanding policy preferences. Chapter I examines
how new technology (remote sensing using unmanned aerial vehicles) facilitates improved
groundwater outcomes, and I use market-based, spatially-dynamic optimization to test the
limitations of these improvements alone and in tandem with typical environmental policy
mechanisms. Chapter II elicits public willingness to pay (WTP) for long-term groundwater
management alternatives and for market and non-market groundwater services. I use timediscounted choice models to endogenously estimate time preferences under different forms of
discounting. This is the first non-market valuation to estimate heterogeneity in time preferences
using flexible mixing distributions free of the constraints imposed when fitting random variables
to common pre-defined distributions (Train, 2016). Chapter III extends the tradition of the
Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to test for systematic influences of narrative frames about
climate change on elicited groundwater and policy preferences. I use a Choice Experiment (CE)
where some respondents were exposed to a structuralist, culturally-biased narrative frame about
climate change and groundwater resources.
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The remaining portion of this introduction devotes greater attention to the motivation for
studying groundwater resource problems within the Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer
(MRVA), the environmental context to each of these empirical studies. I elaborate on the
objectives of each chapter and provide brief reviews of situating literature. Each empirical
chapter also includes its own, more comprehensive, literature review.
The degradation and depletion of water systems is a growing problem worldwide that
threatens the sustainability of social, environmental, and economic systems. In particular, many
important groundwater aquifer systems such as the MRVA in the Lower Mississippi River Basin
(LMRB) exhibit long-term water-level declines due to sustained groundwater pumping for
irrigated agriculture. The consequences of this are multifaceted: increased pumping costs,
decreased discharge to streams and rivers, decreased water quality, increased land subsidence,
and decreased storage capacity. Ultimately, groundwater overdraft threatens the economic
viability of irrigated agriculture in the LMRB, where it is a leading driver of economic activity.
In the state of Arkansas where the eastern Delta region overlies a dominant portion of the
MRVA, the trend of groundwater depletion threatens over $4.5 billion in annual farm income
from irrigated crop production (USDA, 2014).
Many of the other social benefits threatened by groundwater depletion are non-market
benefits. The values that people attribute to non-market groundwater services are less
straightforward to quantify, but understanding the relationship between policy preferences and
non-market groundwater benefits is important for policy makers, stakeholders, and the public
who need to balance existing interactions between different water uses in weighing policy
alternatives to address water scarcity issues. Evidence of the ways that groundwater resource
attributes influence perceptions about costs and benefits enriches policy analysis and provides
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valuable data for policy evaluation. In a study that integrates institutional rational choice theory
and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to explain actor perceptions about a commonpool resource dilemma, greater congruence between values and alternatives has been shown to
increase perceptions of policy effectiveness, promoting cooperation and implementation success
(Lubell, 2003). Policy evaluations should recognize as an important criterion the degree to
which potential alternatives conform to community values.
The underlying goal of Chapter I is to examine the potential for improved groundwater
outcomes via policy programs that offer financial incentives to agricultural producers to adopt
new water-saving technologies and practices. I construct an integrated environmental-economic
model that incorporates spatial dynamics of the landscape and groundwater environments and
includes feedbacks in modeling production decisions. I compare two technologies, soil moisture
sensors and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), for cost-effectiveness and net return per acre-foot
of aquifer retention. I also compare outcomes with and without the presence of other best
management practices (BMPs), allowing for the construction of on-farm reservoirs and tailwater
recovery systems to help reduce pumping costs and promote aquifer recharge. To test the
robustness of findings, I include a sensitivity analysis of simulated outcomes using a range of
different assumptions about technology costs, given that some of these costs are uncertain.
Finally, I compare typical incentive-based environmental policies such as cost-share programs
and pumping fees for improved water management and aquifer retention.
Chapter I fits most directly into the vast literature that exists regarding irrigation
efficiency. This is because improving efficiency is the primary causal mechanism by which
most market-based policies seek to influence improved outcomes. Given the technologies
compared in this empirical analysis, I rely on basic research programs about variable-rate
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irrigation (VRI) highlighted, for example, by Hedley (e.g., Hedley and Yule, 2009a; Hedley et
al., 2009; Hedley et al., 2010a; Hedley et al., 2010b; Hedley et al., 2013) and Evett (e.g., Peters
and Evett, 2008; Evett et al., 2014). A range of empirical studies were necessary in order to
populate parameters for dynamic hydrologic modeling. Chapter I also relates closely to studies
employing the same dynamic optimization model toward other groundwater management
questions. Kovacs et al. (2015) looked closely at the groundwater savings potential of on-farm
reservoirs and found significant modeling differences when using a spatial-dynamic aquifer
compared to a single-cell, ‘bathtub,’ aquifer. Kovacs et al. (2014) used the same dynamic model
to demonstrate how on-farm reservoirs can jointly manage groundwater retention and surface
water quality outcomes. Kovacs et al. (2016) and Kovacs and West (2016) examined tradeoffs
between market benefits and ecosystem services. Kovacs et al. (2017) used efficiency frontiers
to evaluate optimal landcover and irrigation practices. Chapter I continues this line of research
inquiries.
The objectives that undergird Chapter II are to elicit public WTP for long-term
groundwater management alternatives in the MRVA and for market and non-market
groundwater services over time, and to endogenously estimate time preferences for groundwater
benefits and costs. A corollary objective is to estimate individual-level heterogeneity in WTP
and time preferences using random parameters with flexible mixing distributions. Train (2016)
recently developed the Logit mixed logit (LML) model that allows for increased flexibility in the
specification of random parameter distributions by incorporating a second logit term in the
random utility model (RUM) that estimates a probability density function for individual
parameter values. I integrate time discounting into a discounted Logit mixed logit (D-LML)
model and leverage this flexibility in the estimation of endogenous individual time preferences to
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revisit Meyer’s (2013a) and Lew’s (2018) comparisons of alternative discounting forms using
CE data. Improved fit and new interpretations using flexible mixing distributions make this
study a valuable contribution to the literature on time preferences for environmental goods and
policies. This contribution is above and beyond that provided by empirical estimates of public
WTP for comprehensive groundwater services and alternative management policies, including a
cap and trade groundwater permits marketplace.
Chapter III aims to test for the presence of systematic framing effects with respect to
groundwater management policy preferences in response to a culturally-biased narrative about
climate change. I use a structuralist narrative frame imbued with generalizable meaning using
Cultural Theory (CT) (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990). Previous
research by Jones and Song (2014) showed that narrative frames influence the way individuals
organize information about climate change and policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. However, few if any studies about climate change perception acknowledge the
distinction between policies that target controversial causes of climate change and other policies
that mitigate long-term consequences. The distinction is important to public policy as
governments respond to climate change. I contribute to the literature by conducting a CE to
estimate public preferences for long-term groundwater management policies and the
groundwater services under threat from climate change.
Few studies measure policy preferences in response to generalizable narrative form and
content. Jones and Song (2014) used a structuralist narrative frame but did not measure policy
preferences. Berinsky and Kinder (2006) measured policy preferences relating to the 1990’s
Kosovo intervention, but they did not employ a structuralist narrative from which meaningful
systematic inference could be derived. Zanocco et al. (2018) used a structuralist narrative to
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measure cultural influences related to hydraulic fracturing preferences but does not use a choice
context that compares to voting where individuals must make choices among limited options that
involve important tradeoffs. McMorris et al. (2018) measured hydraulic fracturing preferences
and narrative responses employing survey measures modeled in the choice context of a vote.
Using a CE to measure policy preferences and narrative influence, Chapter III contributes to this
line of literature because CE data provide direct evidence about heterogeneity in preferences
related to the different attributes of a policy alternative while forcing respondents to make
choices involving important tradeoffs between those attributes. I estimate mixed logit models
with interaction terms for treatment effects to look for evidence of cultural cognition and test for
systematic congruence and incongruence with the cultural frame.
References
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Evett, S. R., O’Shaughnessy, S. A., Colaizzi, P. D., and Schwartz, R. C. (2014). Soil water
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I. Addressing Groundwater Declines with Precision Agriculture: An Economic
Comparison of Monitoring Methods for Variable Rate Irrigation
Co-author: Kent Kovacs
More than 80 percent of the consumptive water use in the United States, which is the
water lost to the environment, goes to irrigated agriculture (Schaible and Aillery, 2012). The
Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer of the Delta is used by agriculture in Arkansas,
Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and irrigated acreage has more than doubled from 1982 to
2007 (Schaible and Aillery, 2012). Critical groundwater areas in the Delta region of eastern
Arkansas continue to experience decline as groundwater demand outpaces recharge. Demand for
groundwater constitutes 81% of the total water demand in the East Arkansas Region (Figure 1),
and a groundwater gap of over seven million acre-feet is projected for 2050 (ANRC, 2014). A
declining aquifer raises the cost of pumping groundwater and risks the future profitability of
agriculture, the dominant industry in the region. These risks are amplified by prospects of longterm drought and climate uncertainty. Additional benefits to society of a greater aquifer volume
include the avoidance of subsidence, less seepage of surface water from riparian areas vital to
wildlife, and less pumping of underlying aquifers used for drinking water in towns. There is a
need to move toward sustainable levels of groundwater withdrawal.
Precision agriculture provides the potential to enhance irrigation efficiency through sitespecific variable-rate irrigation management of crops. Irrigation efficiency is defined as the ratio
of applied water that is beneficially used for crop growth to the total amount of applied water
(Canessa et al., 2011). The irrecoverable fraction of applied water includes runoff from a
geographic area, evaporation, and plant evapotranspiration (Canessa et al., 2011; Allen et al.,
2003). Some fraction of applied irrigation water is recoverable, re-entering the aquifer in the

10

future as deep percolation (Canessa et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2003). Field-level spatial variability
in soil characteristics results in spatial variability of irrigation efficiency and can lead to over- or
under- application of water under uniform application conditions. In most cases, a farmer will
tend to over-apply to account for uneven distribution of water in the field and maximize yield
(Snyder et al., 1986). Mapping the variability of appropriate field conditions using remote
monitoring methods can allow a farmer to apply variable-rate irrigation management and
maintain yields while decreasing water use and groundwater pumping (Hedley and Yule, 2009a;
Hedley et al., 2009; Hedley et al., 2010a; Hedley et al., 2010b).
Precision agriculture adoption is one means by which farmers can limit the overapplication of crop production inputs such as irrigation water and nutrients by using technology
to inform site-specific management according to spatially localized conditions (Hedley et al.,
2010a; Thrikawala et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2013). The spatial information technologies that
have enabled precision agriculture include global positioning systems, geographic information
systems, remote sensing, and variable-rate application technologies (Lowenber-DeBoer, 1999).
Precision agriculture involves combining the functions of these technologies to help with
decision-making about crop and soil management in specific field locations (Strickland et al.,
1998).
For the purposes of managing variable irrigation rates, two different paradigms of
monitoring field-level spatial variability have emerged and proved effective: one based on
monitoring soil properties and the other on monitoring plant conditions (Hedley and Yule,
2009a; Peters and Evett, 2008; LaRue, 2011). Hedley and Yule (2009a) demonstrated the
potential to reduce irrigation water use by using soil–water balance to inform variable-rate
irrigation of pre-mapped management zones at two sites in New Zealand. Stone et al. (Stone et
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al., 2015) demonstrated the potential of similar methods in the humid Eastern U.S. Soil-based
methods are thought to be superior because they more directly measure water-related stress as a
function of plant available water content, whereas it can be more difficult with plant-based
methods to separate the effect of the soil moisture property from that of other possible stresses
such as nutrient deficiency (Barnes et al., 2003; O’Shaughnessy et al., 2015). Soil water
measurements using soil moisture sensors, however, are only accurate for a small area, and soil
water content is highly variable spatially and temporally (Longchamps et al., 2015). There is
evidence that relative spatial variability of soil water content is persistent over time, further
indicating the feasibility of variable-rate irrigation based on management zones (Starr, 2005;
Hedley and Yule, 2009b).
Networks of remote soil moisture sensors have shown the ability to effectively inform
variable-rate irrigation and contribute to improvements in irrigation efficiency (Hedley and Yule,
2009a; Hedley et al., 2010a; Zhang et al., 2013; LaRue, 2011; O’Shaughnessy et al., 2015).
Though the soil moisture sensors themselves perform in-situ measurement of soil properties,
these networks of sensors are monitored wirelessly by either an automated system or a user
physically removed from the measurement site. In the past, installation of enough soil moisture
sensors to capture soil variability has proven costly for farmers and has limited technology
adoption (Schmitz and Kuyper, 1998; Schmitz and Sourell, 2000). This technology is getting
better and more affordable at the same time that unmanned aerial vehicles are also becoming
more economical for the purposes of plant-based remote sensing. Unmanned aircraft can deliver
a variety of sensing devices including visual, multispectral, and thermal to monitor different
aspects of plant health. There is even potential in the future for these vehicles to serve as the
medium by which important production inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and chemical are applied
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(Stombaugh et al., 2015). Though unmanned aerial vehicles have not been commonly used in
agriculture to this point, the Department of Transit and Federal Aviation Administration have
recently enacted a clear regulatory framework for small unmanned aerial aircraft, and many
expect this to spur more widespread adoption in commercial uses such as agriculture (FAA,
2016; Moffet, 2014).
We compare the two remote monitoring methods, soil moisture sensors and unmanned
aerial vehicles, for cost-effectiveness and net return per acre-foot of aquifer retention by
modeling crop production and groundwater use across a spatially explicit farm landscape in the
Delta region of eastern Arkansas. The model evaluates the optimal crop mix and irrigation
practices to maximize farm returns across the gridded farm landscape. Spatial variation in crop
yields, aquifer thickness, and the costs of groundwater pumping all influence the spatial-dynamic
path of optimal management (Kovacs et al., 2015). The effectiveness of the remote monitoring
methods for enhancing profitability and decreased pumping depends on these spatial variations.
The area for the application of our model encompasses three eight-digit hydrologic unit
code (HUC) watersheds overlying the Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer where
groundwater levels are critical (Figure 1). Eight-digit HUCs define the drainage area of a subbasin of a river (Seaber et al., 1987). In addition to remote monitoring and variable-rate
irrigation, we allow for the construction of on-farm reservoirs and tail-water recovery systems to
help reduce pumping costs and promote recharge of the underlying aquifer. The impacts of
remote monitoring and variable-rate irrigation are evaluated with and without the presence of
reservoirs on the landscape. There are also ranges of potential costs and irrigation efficiencies
associated with these remote monitoring methods, and the implications of these for investment in
the technologies is considered. In addition, the effectiveness of policies that encourage the
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adoption of the remote monitoring for improved water management and aquifer retention is
compared to typical fee and quantity policies for conservation. We describe the model for the
dynamics of land cover, water use, and profit maximization in Section 2 (Materials and
Methods). Also in Section 2, we present data for crop land and model parameters and discuss
sensitivity analyses. Section 3 discusses results, and we conclude with a discussion of major
findings and future research needs.

Figure 1. Three eight-digit hydrologic unit code (HUC) watersheds in the Mississippi
Delta region of eastern Arkansas define the outer boundary of the study area. An eightdigit HUC defines the drainage area of the sub-basin of a river. County lines overlay the
study area. Public land and urban areas are excluded. The location of the study area within
the state of Arkansas is shown.
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Materials and Methods
Methods
We consider how crop patterns and irrigation use change as a farm collective maximizes
profits on the landscape over time. The model is then used to evaluate which approach to
precision irrigation is more cost-effective for reducing groundwater pumping or delivers higher
net return per acre-foot of aquifer retention.
Landcover
The land cover of the farm landscape includes crops, reservoirs, and conserved land set
aside through a rental program of the government. The chosen crops generate economic returns,
and irrigation depletes groundwater. The landscape is spatially heterogeneous due to differences
in long-term investment in farm practices, soil types, and access to water resources (Division of
Agriculture-University of Arkansas, 2012; Clark et al., 2013; ANRC, 2012). A time horizon T is
chosen for a single generation of farmers to observe how depletion of the aquifer influences
production decision, and a grid of m cells (sites) represents spatial differences.
Major crops on the landscape include rice, irrigated soybean, corn, and cotton, nonirrigated sorghum and soybean, and double-cropped irrigated soybean with winter wheat. The
model tracks acreage across n number of land cover types j, including each of the crops,
reservoirs that have tail-water recovery, and the US Department of Agriculture’s Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP). Lijt denotes the amount of land (acres) at site i in land cover type j at the
end of period t. At the end of each period t, which is a 10-year interval, we assume any other
land cover j can become on-farm reservoirs and tail-water recovery or CRP. A 10-year interval is
appropriate because we expect crop rotations to emphasize more profitable crops over a decade,
and this is a typical contract period for CRP land. A profit-maximizing farmer may switch land
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out of irrigated crops into non-irrigated crops with declining groundwater availability at the end
of each period.
The initial land availability equals the sum of the land covers chosen for site i at any time
t (Equation 1).

∑

n
j

Lijt = ∑ j Lij0 ,
n

for j = crops, CRP, on-farm reservoirs

(1)

Irrigation
The average annual irrigation that crop j receives to supplement precipitation, wdj, is the
demand for irrigation in acre-feet. The groundwater stored in the aquifer beneath site i at the end
of the period t is AQit. The water that comes from the on-farm reservoirs is RWit, and the water
from well pumping is GWit. There is recharge of the groundwater, nri, that occurs naturally from
precipitation, streams, and underlying aquifers each period.
Equation (2) shows the acre-feet of water stored in an acre reservoir as

(ωmax + ωmin ) −

ωmax

∑

n
j

Lij 0

(2)

LiRt ,

which includes LiRt as the acres in reservoirs at time t, and the total acreage at site i,

∑

n
j

Lij 0 . If

the reservoir occupies the entire site i and only the rainfall fills the reservoir, then the low-end
acre-feet of water that fills each acre of reservoir is ωmin . If the reservoir is small compared to the
entire site, then

ωmax

∑

n

L
j ij 0

LiRt is close to zero, and the recovery of the runoff and rainfall fills the

reservoir to near capacity in acre-feet per reservoir acre of (ωmax + ωmin ) . This does not account
for temporal variability in the evaporation, leakage, and the timing of rainfall within each period,
which could influence the values of ωmax and ωmin for the reservoir.
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The intensity of well pumping across the landscape influences aquifer depletion
variability over space. The proportion of the underground flow into the aquifer at site k and out
of site i when an acre-foot is pumped from a well at site k is pik, which depends on the distance
and the lateral speed of underground water movement based on the soil profiles observed
between sites (Kovacs et al., 2015). This means the groundwater that leaves site i is

∑

m
k

pik GWkt

. We assume pumps have the same efficiency and power units to deliver a fixed amount of water
per minute.
The water used for irrigation must be less than the water available from reservoirs and
wells (Equation (3)), and Equation (4) indicates the water stored in the reservoirs must be greater
than the water used from the reservoirs. The aquifer volume in the previous period less the
spatially weighted proportion of water pumped from the surrounding sites plus natural recharge
equals the current aquifer volume (Equation (5)). The cost of pumping groundwater at a site,
GCit, depends on the cost to lift an acre-foot of water by one foot, cp, and the initial depth to the
groundwater, dpi. The depletion of the aquifer volume, ( AQi 0 − AQit ) , divided by the area of the
site,

∑

n
j

Lij 0 , shows how much the depth to the aquifer increases. Capital costs per acre-foot for

the well, which accounts for new well drilling in response to aquifer decline, is cc (Equation (6)).

∑

n
j =1

wd j Lijt ≤ GWit + RWit

(3)



ωmax

RWit ≤ (ωmax + ωmin ) − n
LiRt  LiRt

∑ j Lij 0 


(4)

AQit =
AQi ( t −1) − ∑ k pik GWkt + nri

(5)

m
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( AQi 0 − AQit ) 
GCit =
c c + c p  dpi +
n


L
∑
j ij 0



(6)

Profit objective
The cost to produce an acre of the crop, excluding the irrigation costs caj and the price
per conventional unit of the crop, is prj and constant in real terms. We assume no productivity
growth trend for the constant yield of crop j per acre at site i, yij. Excluding the costs of
irrigation, the net value for crop j is then prjyij − caj per acre. The CRP payment per acre to the
landowner, prcrpyicrp, with yield normalized to one and price is the payment per acre, less the cost
to establish and maintain an acre of CRP (cacrp) is the net value per acre of CRP. The reservoir
pumping cost per acre-foot is crw, and the per acre capital and maintenance cost of a reservoir
each period is cr. We make values over time comparable in monetary terms using the real
discount factor, δ t .
Equation (7) indicates the economic objective to maximize the present value of farm
profits over the fixed horizon T by changing the amount of land in each crop or CRP, the
reservoir water use, and groundwater use, namely Lijt, RWit, and GWit. The fixed horizon T is a
30 years in length, and each period is ten years in length. The non-negativity constraints on land,
water use, and the aquifer are shown in Equation (8).

 m n

max : ∑ δ t  ∑∑ ( prj yij − ca j ) Lijt − c r LiRt − c rw RWit − GCit GWit 
Lijt , RWit ,GWit
=t 1
=i 1 =j 1


(7)

Lijt ≥ 0, RWit ≥ 0, GWit ≥ 0, AQit ≥ 0

(8)

T

subject to:
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and the spatial dynamics of land and irrigation (Equations (1)–(6)). We use the non-linear
programming solver CONOPT from AKRI Consulting and Development to perform the
optimization in the Generalized Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS, 2010).
Cost-effectiveness and net returns per acre-foot of aquifer retention
The cost-effectiveness of aquifer retention using precision irrigation is calculated by first
finding the difference in the present value of costs and the difference in the final aquifer volume
between the baseline and a model with only the soil moisture sensors or only the unmanned
aerial vehicles. The baseline model supposes no adoption of soil moisture sensors or unmanned
aerial vehicles, and this is compared to models with only soil moisture sensors or only unmanned
aerial vehicles. The division of the difference in the present value of costs by the difference in
the final aquifer volume indicates the cost effectiveness of a particular precision irrigation
technique. The net returns per acre-foot of aquifer retention come from the division of the
difference in the present value of net returns by the difference in the final aquifer volume.
Sensitivity analyses and conservation policies
The baseline, soil moisture sensors only, and unmanned aerial vehicle only models are
then run again with on-farm reservoirs on the landscape to see how this changes crop choice,
cost-effectiveness, and net-benefit assessments. Another sensitivity analysis considers low- and
high-range costs and water-use efficiencies for each of the crops using either the soil moisture
sensors or the unmanned aerial vehicles.
Policy options for groundwater conservation include cost-share for the precision
irrigation techniques of soil moisture sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles by modifying cajk.
Scenarios regulating groundwater pumping levels and taxing groundwater pumping cost GC are
also compared. The cost share is 60% for soil moisture sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles
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based on the rates from similar improvements under the Natural Resource Conservation
Service’s (NRCS) Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (NRCS, 2014). We chose a
regulation on groundwater pumping to 220% of initial levels and a fee on groundwater pumping
costs of 4% to achieve groundwater conservation similar to the cost share on reservoir
construction. Farm net returns in policy scenarios include the payments to or receipts from the
government because of the policy. Groundwater conservation cost is calculated as the policy cost
(baseline farm net returns less the farm net returns plus government revenue) divided by the
change in aquifer level between the policy option and the baseline. All policy scenarios allow for
construction of on-farm reservoirs.
Data
The outer boundary of the study area consists of three eight-digit HUC watersheds in the
Arkansas Delta region with critical groundwater areas and non-point source pollution priorities
(Figure 1). These watersheds overlap eleven Arkansas counties, and the average for the past 5
years of crop yields by county is a proxy for the yield of the crops (Division of AgricultureUniversity of Arkansas, 2012). We evaluate crop mix and irrigation methods on a landscape with
spatial heterogeneity by dividing the study area into 2724 sites of approximately 600 acres each.
At this size, sites approximate farm scale and realistically capture the dynamics of the aquifer in
response to pumping across the landscape. Sites having entirely non-cropland uses in the 2013
Cropland Data Layer (CDL), e.g., public lands, water, and urban areas, are removed (Johnson
and Mueller, 2010). The initial acreage of rice, corn, cotton, soybeans, and sorghum comes from
the 2013 CDL, and on the basis of harvested acreage for 2010–2011 the soybean acreage is split
into non-irrigated soybean, irrigated soybean, and double crop soybeans (Table 1) (USDANASS, 2012). In addition, to account for the time-value of money in the optimization of returns
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over the 30-year period, the yield of the 30-year Treasury Bond over the last decade suggests and
we employ a real discount rate of 5% (US Treasury Department, 2012). Over the last 5 to 10
years the real discount rate is close to 2%, but looking back over 30 years a 5% discount rate is a
better approximation.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the model data across the sites of the study area.
Variabl
e
Li,rice
Li,corn
Li,cotton
Li,isoy
Li,dsoy
Li,dsorg
Li,dbl
yi,rice
yi,cotton
yi,corn
yi,isoy
yi,dsoy
yi,dsorg
yi,dbl
yi,wheat
dpi

Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Initial acres of rice
Initial acres of corn
Initial acres of cotton
Initial acres of irrigated soybean
Initial acres of dry land soybean
Initial acres of dry land sorghum
Initial acres of double crop irrigated soybean and winter wheat
Annual rice yield (cwt per acre) 1
Annual cotton yield (pounds per acre) 1
Annual corn yield (bushels per acre) 1
Annual irrigated soybean yield (bushels per acre) 1
Annual dry land soybean yield (bushels per acre) 1
Annual dry land sorghum yield (bushels per acre) 1
Annual double crop irrigated soybean yield (bushels per acre) 1
Annual winter wheat yields (bushels per acre) 1
Depth to water (feet)

81
52
10
165
57
7
47
71
1012
166
42
25
69
34
57
57
28,04
7
226
0.45

99
77
40
97
49
23
73
3
148
11
4
3
12
1
5
31

Sum
(Thousands)
221
143
26
449
155
20
129
-

11,972

76,398

92
0.19

1.22

AQi

Initial volume of the aquifer (acre-feet)

K
nri

Hydraulic conductivity (feet per day)
Annual natural recharge of the aquifer per acre (acre-feet)

Note: Number of sites is 2724; 1 The mean and the standard deviation of the county yields come
from the 11 counties of the study area.
Aquifer
Table 1 shows the initial depth to the water table and volume of the Alluvial aquifer from
the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC, 2012). The acreage of the site times the
saturated thickness of the aquifer is the volume of the aquifer at site i. The natural recharge, nri,
of the Alluvial aquifer is based on a calibrated model of recharge for the period 1994 to 1998
associated with precipitation, flow to or from streams, and other groundwater fluxes (Reed,
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2003). It is important to note that improvements in irrigation efficiency resulting from the use of
precision irrigation impact both recoverable and irrecoverable fractions of applied irrigation
water. Some improvement comes in the form of decreased amounts of direct evaporation and
runoff which directly contributes to groundwater conservation (Allen et al., 2003; Yohannes and
Tadesse, 1998; Kebede et al., 2014). This is accompanied, however, by decreased amounts of the
recoverable fraction of deep percolation. The proportions of improved irrigation efficiency
attributable to recoverable and irrecoverable fractions are not precisely known. Furthermore,
decision makers in many aquifer systems consider losses to deep percolation to be irrecoverable
fractions due to the amount of time it takes for water to reach a reusable state (Canessa et al.,
2011; CALFED, 2006; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014). With these facts in mind, we do not consider
differences in the rate of recoverable deep percolation resulting from precision irrigation in our
modeled calculations of aquifer levels.
The spatial weight (pik) is the expected proportion of groundwater that flows underground
out of site i into site k when an acre-foot of groundwater is pumped from site k, where pik is
based on the distance between sites i and k, the saturated thickness, and hydraulic conductivity of
the aquifer (Kovacs et al., 2015). These dynamics dictate how well pumping reduces the aquifer
beneath the surrounding cells. The aquifer below the well and the aquifer of the surrounding sites
declines in response to well pumping. Water flows from the aquifer of surrounding sites into the
site with the cone of depression created by the pumped well. The distance from the pumped site
and the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer, as described above, influence the volume of the
underground flow from the surrounding sites. Clark et al. (2013) use spatially coarse pilot points
to digitize the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer measured by feet per day. The spatial weight

22

depends on the volume of underground flow, and this determines how much an acre-foot of
water pumped from a well reduces the aquifer beneath the surrounding sites.
Farm production and the on-farm reservoir and tail-water recovery system
The costs of production by crop from the 2014 Crop Cost of Production estimates,
excluding irrigation, are shown in Table 2 (Flanders et al., 2014). The crop specific irrigation
water use comes from the Division of Agriculture (Division of Agriculture-University of
Arkansas, 2012). The 5-year average of December futures prices for harvest time contracts for all
crops are used for the crop prices (GPTC, 2012). The sign-ups in Arkansas as of March 2015
indicate the CRP payment per acre (USDA-FSA, 2015).
Table 2. Value of economic and irrigation model parameters.
Parameter
prrice
prcot
prcorn
prsoy
prsorg
prwht
carice
cacorn
cacotton
caisoy
cadsoy
cadsorg
cadbl
wdrice
wdcorn
wdcotton
wdisoy
wddbl
ωmin
ωbase
ωmax
c’min
c’base
c’max

c rw
cp
δt

Definition
Price of rice ($/cwt)
Price of cotton ($/lbs)
Price of corn ($/bushel)
Price of soybeans ($/bushel)
Price of sorghum ($/bushel)
Price of wheat ($/bushel)
Annual production cost of rice ($/acre)
Annual production cost of corn ($/acre)
Annual production cost of cotton ($/acre)
Annual production cost of irrigated soybean ($/acre)
Annual production cost of dry land soybean ($/acre)
Annual production cost of dry land sorghum ($/acre)
Annual production cost of double crop irrigated soybean and winter wheat ($/acre)
Annual irrigation per acre of rice (acre-feet)
Annual irrigation per acre of corn (acre-feet)
Annual irrigation per acre of cotton (acre-feet)
Annual irrigation per acre of full-season soybean (acre-feet)
Annual irrigation per acre of double crop soybean (acre-feet)
Low-end annual capacity per acre of reservoir (acre-feet)
Baseline annual capacity per acre of reservoir (acre-feet)
High-end annual capacity per acre of reservoir (acre-feet)
Low-end annual per acre cost of reservoir ($/acre) a
Baseline annual per acre cost of reservoir ($/acre) a
High-end annual per acre cost of reservoir ($/acre) a
Cost to re-lift an acre-foot to and from the reservoir ($/acre-foot)
Cost to raise an acre-foot of water by one foot ($/foot)
Discount factor

Value
14.00
0.88
5.50
11.99
5.23
6.39
646
632
742
349
289
270
656
2.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.75
4.0
7.5
11.0
285
377
777
22.62
0.55
0.98

Note: a this is the annual amortized construction cost and maintenance cost for each acre of
reservoir.
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Variable irrigation costs from wells or reservoirs include fuel, lube and oil, irrigation
labor, and poly pipe for furrow irrigation plus the levee gates for the flood irrigation of rice
(Hogan et al., 2010). The fuel cost per acre-foot of groundwater depends on the fuel needed to
raise water from the aquifer, which depends on the depth to the aquifer and the efficiency of the
pump, gear-head, and motor. The groundwater pump is assumed to deliver 1800 gallons per
minute and the stationary re-lift pump for the reservoir and tail-water recovery system to deliver
2000 gallons per minute (Hogan et al., 2010). The range in diesel use for a well is 13 gallons of
diesel per acre-foot for a 100 foot well to 26 gallons of diesel per acre-foot for a 200-foot well,
and 6 gallons of diesel is needed per acre-foot for pumping water to and from the reservoir
(Division of Agriculture-University of Arkansas, 2012). To account for the oil and lube for
irrigation equipment, we add 10% to the fuel cost of $3.77 per gallon of diesel fuel (EIA, 2012).
To calculate a capital cost per acre-foot pumped, the capital cost of the irrigation equipment is
amortized, and this is divided by the acre-feet pumped from the well (Hogan et al., 2010). These
technologies and costs characterize the conventional irrigation methods of our baseline scenario.
On-farm reservoir/tail-water recovery construction and maintenance costs for various
reservoir sizes were estimated using Modified Arkansas Off-Stream Reservoir Analysis
(MARORA) to obtain capital cost estimates (Smartt et al., 2002). Since a majority of the
construction cost for a reservoir rests on the cost to move one cubic yard of soil, this cost was
updated from $1 per cubic yard to $1.2 per cubic yard to reflect changes in fuel cost. The
remainder of the investment and maintenance cost comes from MARORA estimates and includes
re-lift pumps for moving water from the tail-water pit to the reservoir and from the reservoir to
the field. The reservoir and tail-water recovery system capital cost is amortized to annual per
acre payments. The minimum volume of water (ωmin) an acre reservoir will hold comes from the
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tail-water recovery system collecting rainfall alone to fill a reservoir by 1.4 acre-feet of water
(Young et al., 2004). The maximum capacity accounting for evaporation of 11 acre-feet per acre
is based on irrigation runoff supplementing the rainfall runoff (Smartt et al., 2002).
Production cost and water use factors for remote monitoring technologies
Model scenarios involving precision irrigation technologies require adjustment factors for
production cost and water use. Table 3 reports these factors by crop type. In addition to a
baseline scenario, adjustment factors are provided for sensitivity analyses involving low and high
cost and water use scenarios. Water use improvements resulting from soil moisture sensorinformed variable-rate irrigation were taken from LaRue (2011), who conducted field
experiments to determine the benefits of variable-rate irrigation relative to applying uniform
irrigation amounts. Hedley et al. (2009) and Hedley et al. (2010b) also observed comparable
water savings over several years using similar methods. The adjustment factor for water use in
the baseline scenario draws from these experimental results, while the high and low adjustment
factors used for sensitivity analysis come from discussion in Hedley et al. (2013). The soil
moisture sensor network and variable-rate system used in the field experiments were similar to
Vories et al. (2008), and costs associated with these methods were gathered from several sources
and used to calculate additional per-acre production costs associated with the soil moisture
sensors. Production cost adjustment factors were calculated separately for each of the crop types.
Soil mapping is necessary for delineating management zones, and services are available for
approximately $4.00 per acre Camp et al., 2006; Meron et al., 2010; Evett et al., 2014; Olson,
2000). An interval of five years is used for the re-delineation of management zones. The network
of soil moisture sensors costs approximately $8,400 for a farm similar in size to a single grid cell
(600 acres) in our modeled study area, while a digital data logger costs approximately $1300,
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and both may need replacing approximately every five years (Vellidis et al., 2008). Costs for a
retrofitted variable-rate irrigation system approximate $50,000 for a farm of grid cell size, and it
is assumed to last the entire thirty years of the study period (USDA-NRCS, 2016). Capital costs
were amortized and all additional production costs calculated on an annual per-acre basis in
present value terms, allowing for easy calculation of adjustment factors for production costs.
The same retrofitted variable-rate system is used with the scenario of precision irrigation
informed by unmanned aerial vehicles monitoring plant conditions. The application of unmanned
aerial vehicles for precision management through mapping crop water stress has been
demonstrated (Herwitz et al., 2004; Berni et al., 2009a; Berni et al., 2009b; Xiang and Tian,
2011; Shi et al., 2016). Because unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor plant conditions with a
high degree of spatial resolution—as opposed to the limited point measurements of soil moisture
sensors—soil mapping is not a necessary cost associated with this practice. The use of unmanned
vehicles for mapping water stress depends on unmanned fixed-wing aircraft equipped with GPS,
autopilot, and appropriate sensing devices. The platform used in modeling this scenario is
described in Ireland-Otto et al. (Ireland-Otto et al., 2016). It is a X-8 fixed-wing craft with a
ground control station and launcher ($12,000). A thermal infrared sensor ($3500) mounted under
the aircraft is necessary to monitor water stress. Aircraft and sensor replacement are assumed at
ten years. Some data processing is required to apply monitoring data to variable-rate irrigation, at
an annual cost of $0.20 per acre. Automated closed-loop programs that include data processing
are likely to emerge in the near future, so costs are likely to change. Peters and Evett (2008)
demonstrated the automation of variable-rate irrigation using the Temperature-Time-Threshold
(TTT) method of plant monitoring to determine water stress and compared results with those of
soil moisture sensor monitoring methods. The TTT method was not quite as water efficient as the
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soil moisture sensing method. Based on the relative water-use efficiencies for increasing yield
observed by Peters and Evett (2008) (TTT = 0.909 kg dry biomass/m3 irrigation water, SMS =
0.961 kg dry biomass/m3 irrigation water), a water-use adjustment factor for each crop was
calculated for the precision irrigation scenario informed by unmanned aerial vehicle monitoring.
Because production cost and water use adjustment factor parameters have been populated
with data collected under different irrigation and cropping systems than we observe and model in
the Arkansas Delta, sensitivity analyses considering low- and high-range costs and water-use
efficiencies are particularly helpful to the cost-effectiveness comparison (Table 3).
Table 3. Value of production cost and irrigation efficiency factors.
Adjustment Factor

Scenario

Production cost ($/acre)
Water use (acre-feet)
Production cost factor

a

Irrigation efficiency factor b

Production cost factor

c

Irrigation efficiency factor d

Low e
Base
High e
Low f
Base
High f
Low e
Base
High e
Low f
Base
High f

Rice

Corn

Baseline
646
632
2.5
1
Soil Moisture sensors
1.015
1.016
1.023
1.024
1.041
1.042
0.64
0.64
0.88
0.88
0.92
0.92
Unmanned aerial vehicles
1.014
1.014
1.022
1.022
1.039
1.040
0.69
0.69
0.93
0.93
0.98
0.98

Note: a (52–54); b (15); c (52,55); d (14); e (63,64); f (49).

Cotton

Irrigated
Soybean

Double Crop
Soybean

742
1

349
1

656
0.75

1.013
1.020
1.035
0.64
0.88
0.92

1.028
1.043
1.075
0.64
0.88
0.92

1.015
1.023
1.040
0.64
0.88
0.92

1.012
1.019
1.034
0.69
0.93
0.98

1.025
1.040
1.073
0.69
0.93
0.98

1.013
1.021
1.039
0.69
0.93
0.98

Results
Table 4 indicates the results of the baseline model without precision irrigation or
reservoirs. The relative prices over the last 5 years make rice and corn the predominant crops on
the landscape at the end of the study period (Figure 2a), and both are irrigation intensive crops.
This makes the aquifer decline from 76 million acre-feet to 48.2 million acre-feet in 2045, and
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the 30-year farm net returns are $5.22 billion. We compare these results with a landscape where
farms adopt soil moisture sensors or unmanned aerial vehicles to reduce the costly application of
irrigation water. The use of soil moisture sensors increases the amount of land in rice from 305
thousand acres to 343 thousand acres, and most of the rice acreage adopts soil moisture sensors
to mitigate irrigation costs (Figure 2b). The increase in rice acreage is accompanied by a decline
in corn, cotton, soybean, and non-irrigated sorghum acres. Although rice acreage expands, the
soil moisture sensors mean less well pumping, and the aquifer in the final period is close to 48.7
million acre-feet. Figure 2d,e depicts the extent of precision irrigation adoption under each
scenario.
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles increases rice acreage to only 316 thousand acres
because of the lower irrigation efficiency compared to soil moisture sensors, and much of the
rice remains in conventional irrigation. There is a slight decline in the acres of corn, cotton,
double crop soybean, and non-irrigated sorghum compared to the baseline (Figure 2c). The final
aquifer volume is 48.6 million acre-feet, slightly lower than the 48.7 million acre-feet with the
soil moisture sensors, but higher than the 48.2 million acre-feet baseline. The soil moisture
sensors have greater net returns per acre-foot conserved than the unmanned aerial vehicles, $9.09
per acre-foot versus $7.69 per acre-foot, because high-value rice acreage increases more with the
soil sensors. The soil moisture sensor technology is more expensive per acre, though, and this
makes it a less cost-effective solution for aquifer retention than the unmanned aerial vehicles.
The positive net returns indicate that both farmers and conservationists gain from the
technologies. Though the utility of unmanned aerial vehicles for precision management through
mapping crop water stress has been demonstrated (Herwitz et al., 2004; Berni et al., 2009a; Berni
et al., 2009b; Xiang and Tian, 2011; Shi et al., 2016), and plant-based monitoring of water stress
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to automate variable-rate irrigation has shown the ability to improve irrigation water use (Peters
and Evett, 2008), systematic and multidisciplinary research is still necessary to verify and
quantify improvements from managing crop inputs based on images from unmanned aerial
vehicles (Shi et al., 2016; Zhang and Kovacs, 2012).
Table 4. Influence of precision irrigation on land and water use in 2045, and 30-year economic
returns without and with on-farm reservoirs.
No Reservoirs
No SMS
Land, Water, and Economic Conditions
and No
SMS
UAV
Land use (1000 acres)
Rice—conventional irrigation
305
110
Rice—PI
233
Irrigated soybeans—conventional irrigation
3
2
Irrigated soybeans—PI
Irrigated corn—conventional irrigation
620
349
Irrigated corn—PI
262
Irrigated cotton—conventional irrigation
63
47
Irrigated cotton—PI
8
Double crop soybean/wheat—conventional
30
28
irrigation
Double crop soybean/wheat—PI
Non-irrigated soybeans
Non-irrigated sorghum
121
104
Reservoirs
Water use (1000 ac-ft./year)

UAV

Reservoirs
No SMS
and No
SMS UAV
UAV

187
129
5
356
259
53
7

351
3
684
63
-

103
287
1
390
282
48
7

230
127
5
394
284
55
7

29

-

-

-

117
-

22
18

8
16

23
17

1581.
6
180.6
1401
50,41
0
5497
1538
62

1594.
3
193.3
1401
50,28
0
5485
769
31

Annual water use

1448

1422

1427

1628.7

Annual reservoir water use
Annual groundwater use

1448
48,210

30 year farm net returns (million $)
Cost effectiveness ($/ac-ft.)
Net returns per ac-ft. ($/ac-ft.)

5219
-

1427
48,60
0
5222
256
7.69

202.7
1426

Aquifer

1422
48,76
0
5224
364
9.09

50,150
5481
-

Note: SMS: Soil-moisture sensors; UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicles; PI: precision irrigation.
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Figure 2. Predominant crops grown on the landscape in: (a) the baseline (No SMS and no
UAV); and with precision irrigation using (b) soil moisture sensors (SMS); or (c) unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV). Non-irrigated crops and precision irrigated rice replace corn when remote
sensing techniques are adopted. The percent of cropland using precision irrigation is shown when
the remote sensing technique is: (d) soil moisture sensors; and (e) unmanned aerial vehicles. The
percentage of precision irrigated cropland is higher in the northern and western sections of the
landscape where the aquifer is more depleted.
The presence of on-farm reservoirs and tail-water recovery increases the land in rice and
corn compared to the baseline, and the non-irrigated sorghum is nearly gone. When the soil
moisture sensors are adopted on the landscape rice increases to 390 thousand acres, corn falls to
672 thousand acres, and the acres in both non-irrigated crop and in reservoirs falls. The aquifer
level in the final period rises to 50.4 million acre-feet from 50.2 million acre-feet without the soil
moisture sensors. If unmanned aerial vehicles are adopted on the landscape with reservoirs, then
the rice acres rise slightly to 357 thousand acres, and the corn acres fall to 678 thousand acres.
The acres in reservoirs and non-irrigated sorghum are virtually unchanged from the landscape
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with reservoirs but without the unmanned aerial vehicles. The aquifer volume increased slightly
over the baseline with 50.3 million acre-feet in the final period.
The net returns per acre-foot are higher for the precision irrigation when reservoirs are
used on the landscape. This is because more crops use irrigation when reservoirs provide surface
water. The farm returns to irrigation that is more efficient and the aquifer retention are magnified
by precision irrigation when more of the landscape is using irrigation than before. The net returns
per acre are $62 per acre-foot for the soil moisture sensors and $31 per acre-foot for the
unmanned aerial vehicles. Looking only at cost-effectiveness for an acre-foot of aquifer
retention, though, the unmanned aerial vehicles are preferred since the technology is somewhat
less expensive.
The cost and irrigation efficiency of the soil moisture sensors and unmanned aerial
vehicles is not known with certainty. We use a low and high-end range for the cost and irrigation
efficiency of the precision irrigation technologies to see how crop choice, well pumping, and the
farm net returns are affected in Table 5. For the soil moisture sensors, rice expands to 452
thousand acres for the low cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario while the high cost/low
irrigation efficiency scenario has rice expand to just 331 thousand acres. The large expansion of
rice in the low cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario makes corn and other crop acreage fall
compared to the baseline, and even though more irrigation intensive rice is grown, the well
pumping falls to 1422 thousand acre-feet in the final period because the soil moisture sensors
increase irrigation efficiency. The crop mix in the high cost/low irrigation efficiency scenario for
the soil moisture sensors is largely the same as the landscape without the soil moisture sensors.
The well pumping, though, does fall from the baseline to 1433 thousand acre-feet in the final
period because of soil moisture sensor adoption.
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis of the costs and irrigation efficiency of precision irrigation on land
and water use in 2045, and 30-year economic returns.
No
Low
SMS
Land, Water, and Economic Conditions
Cost/High
and No
IE SMS
UAV
Land use (1000 acres)
Rice—conventional irrigation
305
91
Rice—PI
361
Irrigated soybeans—conventional irrigation
3
0
Irrigated soybeans—PI
Irrigated corn—conventional irrigation
620
282
Irrigated corn—PI
254
Irrigated cotton—conventional irrigation
63
34
Irrigated cotton—PI
18
Double crop soybean/wheat—conventional
30
23
Double crop soybean/wheat—PI
Non-irrigated soybeans
Non-irrigated sorghum
121
79
Reservoirs
Water use (1000 ac-ft./year)
Annual groundwater use
1448
1295
Aquifer
48,210
50,240
30 year farm net returns (million $)
5219
5402
Cost effectiveness ($/ac-ft.)
148
Net returns per ac-ft. ($/ac-ft.)
90

High
Cost/Low
IE SMS

Low
Cost/High
IE UAV

High
Cost/Low
IE UAV

99
232
2
349
265
48
9
29
108
-

90
340
0
311
242
39
12
25
81
-

231
73
6
363
255
56
7
30
121
-

1433
48,560
5222
486
8.57

1338
49,770
5328
110
70

1437
48,390
5220
365
5.55

Note: SMS: Soil-moisture sensors; UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicles; PI: precision irrigation; IE:
Irrigation efficiency.
These crop and water use changes on the landscape from the soil moisture sensor use
make the 30-year farm net returns edge up slightly with the high cost/low irrigation efficiency
scenario and go up substantially to $5.40 billion in the low cost/high irrigation efficiency
scenario. The aquifer rises to 50.2 million acre-feet in the low cost/high irrigation efficiency
scenario and to just 48.6 million acre-feet in the high cost/low irrigation efficiency scenario. The
net-benefit assessment indicates $90 per acre-foot if the soil moisture sensors are low cost and
high efficiency, and a modest $8.57 per acre-foot for high cost and low efficiency sensors. This
means there is a wide range of potential net returns to an optimized landscape allowing the use of
soil moisture sensors, but implementation that more closely approximates the low cost/high
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irrigation efficiency scenario can generate substantial gains to both farmers and the aquifer. The
use of unmanned aerial vehicles makes the rice acreage expand to 430 thousand acres in the low
cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario but fall slightly to 304 thousand acres in the high cost/low
irrigation efficiency scenario. The low cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario for unmanned
aerial vehicles has 1338 thousand acre-feet of well pumping in the final period because the
unmanned aerial vehicles allow for a reduction in water use even as rice acres expand. There are
1437 thousand acre-feet of well pumping in the final period for the high cost/low efficiency
scenario, only slightly below the baseline, because there is limited adoption of the unmanned
aerial vehicles when the irrigation efficiency is low. The aquifer rises to 49.7 million acre-feet
and 30-year farm net returns rise to $5.3 billion in the low cost/high efficiency scenario;
however, the aquifer rises to only 48.4 million acre-feet and $5.2 billion in 30-year farm net
returns for the high cost/low irrigation efficiency scenario. The wide range in the net returns per
acre-foot for the low and high-end scenarios, from $70 to $5.55 per acre-foot, for the unmanned
aerial vehicles indicates, as for the soil sensors, that improving the efficiency of the technology is
valuable for profitability and aquifer retention.
The use of cost-share assistance to encourage precision irrigation, shown in Table 6,
improves farm net returns over 30 years and increases the volume of the aquifer, but the subsidy
represents a loss of government revenue that the taxpayer must bear. The policies result in a loss
of economic value to society because the rise in farm net returns is less than the loss in
government revenue. However, these polices allow more of the aquifer to be retained. The
groundwater conservation cost per acre-foot for the study period is found by dividing the
economic cost to society of the policy by the acre-feet of the aquifer conserved. The soil
moisture sensors are more irrigation-efficient and only slightly more expensive than the
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unmanned aerial vehicles, and this makes the $59 groundwater conservation cost per acre-foot
for the cost-share on the soil moisture sensors less than the $67 cost per acre-foot for the
unmanned aerial vehicles. The cost-share policies are both expensive, however, compared to the
groundwater conservation cost associated with policies such as a cap on groundwater use
($12/acre-foot) or a fee on groundwater use ($1.6 acre-foot). Policies that target groundwater use
directly through a cap or tax appear more cost-effective at groundwater conservation than the
policies that offer a cost-share on irrigation technology for crops such as cotton and soybeans
that are not especially irrigation intensive.
Table 6. Water conservation policies influence on aquifer, and economic returns, government
revenue, and groundwater conservation cost
Policy
Baseline
Cost share on soil moisture sensors c
Cost share on unmanned aerial
hi l
Cap on groundwater
use d
Fee on groundwater use d

Aquifer,
2045
(Thousand
Acre-Feet)
48,210
49,140
48,540
49,510
49,430

Farm Net
Returns, 30 Year
NPV a ($ Millions)
5219
5231
5231
5204
5150

Government
Revenue, 30
Year NPV ($
Millions)
−67
−34
2

Groundwater
Conservation
Cost b ($ Per
Acre-Foot)
$59
$67
$12
$1.6

Note: All allow on-farm reservoirs. a The farm net returns include the payments to or receipts
from the government because of the policy; b Groundwater conservation cost is calculated as the
policy cost (which is the farm net returns in the baseline less the farm net returns plus
government revenue for each policy scenario) divided by the change in aquifer level between the
policy option and the baseline; c The cost share is 60% for soil moisture sensors and unmanned
aerial vehicles based on the rates from the Natural Resource Conservation Service’s (NRCS)
Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (33); d We choose a cap on groundwater pumping
(220% of initial pumping levels) and a fee on groundwater pumping costs (4%) to achieve
groundwater conservation similar to the cost share on soil moisture sensors.
Discussion
Our results support the conclusion that remote monitoring to inform variable-rate
irrigation practices is an increasingly viable alternative for reducing groundwater depletion
through precision agriculture. We demonstrate that remote monitoring to inform variable-rate
irrigation can improve irrigation efficiency modestly enough to conserve aquifer volumes, reduce
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pumping costs, and increase net returns by still allowing for more production of profitable but
water-intensive rice. Furthermore, our results indicate the potential of remote monitoring and
variable-rate irrigation to provide benefits in tandem with other complimentary practices such as
the use of the on-farm reservoirs.
The uncertainty around the cost and water-use efficiency of the remote sensing
techniques suggest that the net-returns per acre-foot of aquifer retention could be significantly
larger or a little lower than the baseline costs and water use efficiencies for the precision
irrigation techniques suggest. As the costs of the sensors fall and the efficiencies continue to
improve, then the net returns per acre-foot of conserved aquifer promise to become substantially
larger. As an important reminder, our model makes the simplifying assumption that all reduction
in applied water due to improved irrigation efficiency saves irrecoverable fractions of applied
irrigation water. While the overwhelming proportion of annual recharge to the alluvial aquifer is
the result of precipitation and surface water flux (Reed, 2003), precision irrigation scenarios may
overestimate the aquifer volume by failing to account for decreased levels of deep percolation
over the long term.
A cost-share policy to encourage more adoption of the sensing technologies appears to
incur greater costs on society than either a regulatory cap of groundwater use or tax on
groundwater use. Leaving aside issues surrounding an equitable share of the conservation burden
across the agricultural producers and the rest of society, the most efficient approach to
conservation is through directly targeting the overused resource with a cap or a tax.
The evaluation of benefits and costs here between soil moisture sensors and unmanned
aerial vehicles only considers increased performance in irrigation efficiency with respect to soilbased versus plant-based monitoring regimes. We do not consider other benefits of variable-rate
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irrigation or other applications of remote monitoring which might present other benefits. Another
implication of targeted spatial application of irrigation is that nutrient and sediment runoff is
minimized, improving the quality of surface waters (EPA, 2003). In addition, it may be possible
to monitor a range of other plant conditions with unmanned aerial vehicles at little additional
cost that are not able to be measured by wireless soil moisture sensors (Stombaugh et al., 2015).
Explicit spatial management of other crop conditions might even allow farmers to realize more
fully the benefits of high spatial resolution monitoring. For instance, producers may be able to
improve the efficiency of nutrient application and uptake in a way that both lowers costs and
increases yield. Although many farms may already have spatial soil information, we do not know
how many have this information or how many use any form of precision agriculture. To be
conservative in the adoption rates of this technology, we attribute all the costs of this spatial soil
information to the soil sensors. To the extent most farmers already have this information, the soil
moisture sensors will be more profitable than we have indicated.
The soil sensor technologies resemble a constant return to scale technology more than
other irrigation equipment like center pivots or on-farm reservoirs. This is because soil sensors
only have a particular spatial radius where they are effective. However, the unmanned aerial
vehicle technologies do exhibit economies of scale, and the unquestionable improvement in these
technologies is likely to further increase consolidation in the farming sector. The average farm
size in the region has risen from 750 acres in 2002 to 820 acres in 2012 (USDA, 2012).
Improved sensing technologies are likely to augment this trend.
As costs associated with unmanned aerial vehicles or their services decrease and
monitoring applications increase, the aircraft are likely to surpass soil moisture sensors in terms
of both cost-effectiveness of aquifer savings and net returns. Given that the most attractive policy
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alternative among the farming community also comes at the greatest cost to society, it may be
that widespread implementation of one of these practices depends on a continued drop in costs.
Future work should continue to explore the role of precision technology and high-resolution
monitoring in agriculture by giving needed attention to adapting best practices to region-specific
constraints. Toward this goal, it will be important to continue to characterize the benefits and
costs of these applications under different environmental and economic conditions.
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II. Flexible Estimation of Groundwater and Time Preferences
Co-authors: Kent Kovacs, Rodolfo Nayga Jr., and Heather Snell
Choice experiments (CE) are common in economics to evaluate consumer preferences for
market and non-market goods (e.g., Lusk and Schroeder, 2004; Louviere and Lancsar, 2009;
Johnston et al., 2017; Thiene et al., 2017), and many applications of CE involve non-market
goods that deliver a flow of services over time. Only two studies jointly estimate time
preferences with CE data through random parameter models, using choice scenarios that either
vary the payment horizon (Lew 2018) or vary the timing of future benefits (Meyer 2013a,b) to
elicit joint preferences. Lew (2018) and Meyer (2013a,b) examine whether time preferences
have an exponential form, which assumes a constant discount rate over time, or a hyperbolic
form, which allows discount rates to decline over time. Lew (2018) assumes the time parameter
to be the same for all the respondents, and Meyer (2013a,b) assumes the time parameter is
normally distributed among respondents. Even the assumption that a random time parameter has
a parametric distribution, such as the normal distribution, is limiting (Train, 2016). We utilize a
generalization of the logit-mixed logit model (LML) in Train (2016) to identify the shape of the
distribution of the time parameter.
For flexibility in estimating the distribution of random parameters, the LML supposes
that the probability of each parameter value in finite parameter space comes from a logit function
with terms defined by the researcher to describe the shape of the distribution. The LML has the
researcher choose a polynomial, spline, or other step function to guide, in the estimation, the
search for the shape of the parameter’s distribution. To our knowledge, no study uses the LML
to identify implicit discount rates through the joint estimation of time preferences and CE data.
Our extension, hereafter called the discounted logit-mixed logit (D-LML), helps practitioners
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learn about heterogeneity in the time parameter for a particular good as well as in the utility
coefficients for the observed attributes of that good. We show that the advantage provided by
flexible mixing distributions in the D-LML enables hyperbolic discounting models to represent
heterogeneity in the time parameter such that some individuals can take on values that
approximate exponential discounting. The D-LML also has significant advantage in
computation time compared to a discounted mixed logit (D-MXL) since the probability of a
person’s choices does not depend on the parameters being estimated and therefore does not
change during the estimation (Train, 2016).
Policy makers would benefit from greater knowledge about the value of groundwater
services (NRC, 1997; Tentes and Damigos, 2015). Since meaningful aquifer change occurs over
decades, present value calculations are useful for valuation and policy deliberation related to
groundwater. An understanding of time preferences for the flow of groundwater services is
necessary for those present value calculations. The commonly held assumption that people apply
the same time preferences to utility from different sources of consumption may not be true
(Ubfal, 2016). An average person might be more impatient about the consumption of
environmental goods such as groundwater services or foods than about money or other goods.
This makes the joint estimation of time preferences with the choice of a particular good critical
for policy makers responsible for managing the intertemporal flow of services from that good.
Our CE data come from a survey about the protection of groundwater in the Mississippi
River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVA). In the following section, we review stated preference
literature surrounding discount rates and discuss some of the deficiencies with existing CE
studies that examine groundwater. Most notably, common deficiencies include a lack of
consideration for time preferences, realistic long-term environmental scenarios, or a
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representative range of groundwater services. We detail choice models and an experimental
design intended to address these deficiencies with groundwater studies while providing new
evidence about the nature and form of people’s time preferences using flexibly mixed random
parameters. We estimate and compare model specifications for the D-LML that assume
exponential discounting, different forms of hyperbolic discounting, and a quasi-hyperbolic form
to the time parameter. Discounting most closely exhibits the quasi-hyperbolic form with large
importance given to immediate utility. Time preferences are not normally distributed, and
instead exhibit multimodality and asymmetry with one group of individuals taking on discount
rates that approach zero, a second group taking on rates around 40%, and a third group with
discount rates larger than 80%. Sensitivity models indicate that time preferences are robust
when accounting for high levels of perceived consequentiality (Vossler and Watson, 2013) or for
attribute non-attendance (ANA) (Mariel et al., 2013; Caputo et al., 2018a).
Literature review
Stated time preferences
Past studies estimating implicit discount rates with stated preference data have used either
exogenous or endogenous discounting approaches (Wang and Daziano, 2015). Endogenous
approaches estimate a discount rate parameter directly within the valuation model, while
exogenous approaches require additional estimations outside of the model or else supplemental
questions to infer discount rates then applied to the choice analysis. Most exogenous discounting
studies leverage a two-step approach where the researcher computes the discount rate after
estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for two different periods or payment horizons. This
approach has been used in a variety of contexts, including studies examining wait-time values at
ski lifts (Crocker and Shogren, 1993), salmon restoration value (Stevens et al, 1997), and oyster
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reef restoration value (Kim and Haab, 2009). All of these contingent valuation (CV) studies
assumed exponential discounting. Myers et al. (2017) calculated an implicit discount rate after
estimating WTPs in present values for a one-time payment and for ongoing annual payments
using CV data about protecting migratory shorebirds in the eastern U.S. Among studies that use
CE data, Layton and Brown (2000) employed the two-step approach after administering separate
survey samples involving scenarios with different time horizons for realizing forest losses.
Viscusi et al. (2008), examining water quality, estimated WTP as a function of the time until
improvements would occur by including the timing of water quality benefits as an attribute in the
CE. They calculated discount rates under both exponential and hyperbolic discounting
assumptions.
Fewer studies have opted to use supplemental survey questions to estimate discount rates
exogenously. Newell and Siikamäki (2014) added a set of questions to their CE survey
commonly used in experimental economics for eliciting individual discount rates (e.g. Coller and
Williams, 1999), and they applied estimated rates within their CE analysis. Egan et al. (2015)
used a reward lottery with actual payoffs, following Harrison et al. (2002), to separately estimate
discount rates and then apply them to a CV of wetland restoration. Among exogenous
discounting studies, only Viscusi et al. (2008) estimated implicit discount rates under alternative
assumptions about discounting behavior to the standard exponential form.
Endogenous discounting studies use variations either in the payment horizon (e.g., Kovacs
and Larson, 2008; Bond et al., 2009) or the timing of future benefits (Meyer 2013a, b) in order to
identify the implied discount rate directly within the valuation model. Kovacs and Larson (2008)
conducted a CV that included survey treatments with T=1, 4, 7, or 10-year payment horizons.
Bond et al., (2009) used CV survey treatments with T=1, 5, or 10-year payment horizons. Both
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studies used a valuation model which imposes present-value costs by adding a cumulative
discount factor to the cost term that takes on the exponential form. Sample variation in the
payment horizon makes it possible to identify the discount rate parameter included in this term.
Kovacs and Larson (2008) estimated an annual exponential discount rate around 30%, while
Bond et al. (2009) estimated rates ranging from 23% to 80%. Both sets of findings point to
annual discount rates much larger than would typically be used in policy analysis (e.g. 3-7%).
Lew (2018) conducted a CE with T=1, 5, and 10-year payments to identify implicit discount
rates associated with the protection of an endangered species and found an annual exponential
discount rate of 122%.
Meyer (2013a, b) identified implicit discount rates from CE data by varying the timing of
future benefits. Meyer (2013a, b) specified a random utility model (RUM) that discounts the
flows of both costs and benefits over time, unlike other studies which have discounted only
costs. Meyer (2013b) estimated a much smaller annual exponential discount rate of 13%. Both
Lew (2018) and Meyer (2013a, b) estimated discount rates under assumptions of alternative
discounting, though neither found evidence to reject the exponential discounting form of steady
discount rates over time.
Groundwater CE studies
Groundwater resources generate a range of beneficial services, both direct (e.g.,
extractive uses) and indirect (e.g., subsidence avoidance), and their provision flows over time. A
CE enables researchers to elicit marginal valuations for specific services to understand their
relative importance and groundwater’s total economic value (TEV). Existing groundwater CEs
typically oversimplify their environmental scenarios either by limiting the range of services
considered (e.g., Tempesta and Vecchiato, 2013), ignoring time discounting (e.g., Birol et al.,
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2010; Tempesta and Vecchiato, 2013; Koundouri et al., 2014a, b; Tentes and Damigos, 2015), or
ignoring realistic temporal and environmental dynamics (e.g., Meyer, 2013a, b). Birol et al.
(2010) used a CE to estimate WTP for promoting aquifer recharge in Cyprus. They estimated
marginal WTP values for water quality, water quantity, agricultural employment, and habitat,
and respondents displayed positive and significant WTP for each. About a third of the sample is
farmers and the other two-thirds is the general public. Water quality was valued most by the
general public, while farmers placed greater value on water quantity. Koundouri et al. (2014a)
and Tentes and Damigos (2015) performed CE studies that value the Asopos River Basin and
Aquifer in Greece. Koundouri et al. (2014a) produced marginal estimates associated with water
quality, impact on the local economy, suitable water uses, and water bill costs. Respondents
indicated that the moderate water quality condition was valued most. Koundouri et al. (2014b)
estimated social values for water quantity, recreation, and land income associated with
groundwater in Northern Finland, with the largest values observed for water quantity. Tempesta
and Vecchiato (2013) used a CE to jointly estimate WTP values for groundwater quality and
surface water quality, with greatest value placed on low levels of nitrogen concentration in
groundwater. Only Birol et al. (2010), Koundouri et al. (2014a, b), and Tentes and Damigos
(2015) examined multiple groundwater services, and none of these studies estimated discount
rates in the context of groundwater management. Meyer (2013a, b) estimated endogenous
discount rates through variation in the timing of river basin cleanup. However, the CE used
unrealistic hypothetical scenarios that asked study participants to abstract from the reality of time
lags and imagine that the river basin is “magically” cleaned to the specified level and then
becomes unclean again at specified points in time with no delays. We fill a need in the literature
by jointly estimating marginal WTP values for a range of groundwater services with endogenous

49

discount rates using a CE with scenarios that incorporate realistic temporal dynamics of the
environmental benefits under consideration.
Methods
Intertemporal utility and time preference functions
Public goods policies such as those for the long-term management of groundwater
resources exemplify choices that realize benefits and costs at different points in time. Money
invested today in groundwater savings can produce benefits that continue into the future. In fact,
meaningful benefits from groundwater savings may not accrue or begin to be realized until a
policy has been underway for some years. Measuring the way individuals tend to discount future
costs and benefits of groundwater management allows policy makers to appropriately weigh in
present-value terms the costs of actions now against the benefits that will accrue over time.
Individuals typically discount the utility they receive from future outcomes relative to the utility
of current outcomes. Samuelson (1937) developed the first discounted utility model for
intertemporal choice commonly known as the exponential discounting model, estimating a single
discount rate parameter. This is the standard model for intertemporal utility, largely because of
its simplicity (Meyer, 2013a; Frederick, 2002). The exponential discounting function takes the
form of
𝑇𝑇

𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐0 , 𝑐𝑐1 , … , 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 ) = � 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 ),
1

(9)

𝑡𝑡=0
𝑡𝑡

where the discount factor for year t is 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 = �1+𝜌𝜌� and 𝜌𝜌 is the discount rate.

Alternative functional forms of discounted utility have been developed in order to

reconcile the many situations in which the exponential model does not fit behavior. For
example, inferred discount rates have been found to decline over time (Cairns and van der Pol,
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2000), fitting a functional form termed hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic discounting in its
most popular form is described by
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 = (1 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)−𝛽𝛽/𝛼𝛼 , where 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 > 0

(2)

(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). As α approaches zero, this function becomes the exponential
discounting function. Harvey (1986) imposes a single-parameter structure on Equation 2 to
facilitate estimation of the function by constraining α to be equal to one. The hyperbolic form
described by Harvey is then
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻

𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡

= (1 + 𝑡𝑡)−𝜇𝜇 .

(3)

Note that as 𝜇𝜇 approaches infinity, discounting approximates the exponential form. Herrnstein
(1981) and Mazur (1987) (HM) constrain the term, β/α, to be equal to one:
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = (1 + 𝜔𝜔𝜔𝜔)−1 ,

(4)

and note here that it becomes the exponential form as 𝜔𝜔 approaches zero. More recently, a

quasi-hyperbolic discounting model has received attention in which especially large importance
is placed on immediate utility as compared to deferred utility (Meyer, 2013a; Frederick, 2002).
The functional form, developed by Laibson (1997), is given by
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 = �

1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 = 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
1 𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
�
,
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
0
<
𝛽𝛽
<
1,
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
�
� < 1.
1
1 + 𝜌𝜌
𝛽𝛽 �1 + 𝜌𝜌� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 > 0

(5)

The quasi-hyperbolic model deviates from the exponential model only in that all future time
periods are discounted by an additional β factor.
Hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounters weight the near future less heavily than
exponential discounters but place a greater weight on deferred utility far in the future.
Furthermore, exponential discounters are time consistent because their marginal discount rate is
constant over all time periods, while hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounters are
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dynamically inconsistent. Quasi-hyperbolic discounters have a large marginal discount rate
between time period 0 (the present) and time period 1 and then a constant marginal discount rate
in all periods after. In this way, quasi-hyperbolic discounters behave as exponential discounters
for any choice not involving the present. Hyperbolic discounters may be dynamically
inconsistent for any potential time period but are likely to exhibit greater dynamic inconsistency
for tradeoffs that occur nearer to the present than for tradeoffs that occur far in the future (Meyer,
2013a). 1
We integrate the time preference functions from Equation 1 (exponential), Equation 3
(Harvey), Equation 4 (HM), and Equation 5 (quasi-hyperbolic) into a D-LML model and
compare estimated models for best fit similar to Meyer (2013a; 2013b) and Lew (2018). Meyer
(2013a; 2013b) and Lew (2018) assume that discount rates are normally distributed in the
population. The purpose of this study is to use flexible distributional assumptions about discount
rates to retrieve time preferences with more realistic distributions because the flexible
distributions allow for multimodality and asymmetry.
Empirical model
We evaluate marginal WTP for two groundwater policy alternatives and five different
groundwater services in addition to estimating endogenous discount rates. We use a WTP-space
specification (Train and Weeks, 2005) in our analysis so that flexible distributions of WTP for
marginal groundwater services and policy alternatives can be estimated directly. Given the panel
nature of the choice data in our study, correlation in the stochastic portion of utility is probable.
We use a panel specification of the D-LML and allow for correlations in marginal WTP.

Please refer to Meyer (2013a) and Frederick et al. (2002) for a more thorough discussion of intertemporal utility
and time preference functions.
1
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The Discounted Logit-mixed Logit (D-LML) Model
To analyze the discrete choice data involving intertemporal goods, let the additively
separable utility through time period 𝑇𝑇 for an individual i for alternative j in choice situation k be
given by

𝑇𝑇

𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 )′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,

(6)

𝑡𝑡=0

where 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the individual discount factor for year t; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the weighted sum of

all instantaneous error draws weighted each period by the discount factor, 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 , and is assumed to
be distributed iid extreme value; 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is a random scalar representing the cost/scale parameter;

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the individual cost of the policy alternative in year t; 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 is a vector of estimated
marginal WTPs; and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observed groundwater service attributes for the

alternative in year t. Conditional on 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 and the vector <𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 >, the probability that person i
makes a sequence of choices over K choice situations is the logit formula:
𝐾𝐾

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 , < 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 >) = �

𝑒𝑒 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘

∑𝐽𝐽 𝑒𝑒 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘=1 𝑗𝑗=1

.

(7)

The researcher does not observe the utility coefficients of each individual and knows that they
vary over individuals. The cumulative distribution function of (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 , < 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 >) in the population
is F(𝜓𝜓, < 𝜆𝜆, 𝜔𝜔 >), which Train (2016) calls the mixing distribution. We let F be discrete with
finite support set S. The discretization is not a constraint because the support grid can

approximate a continuous distribution to any degree of accuracy with a sufficiently broad and
dense S (Train, 2016; Caputo et al., 2018b). Let us denote the vector containing <𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 > and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖

for individual i as 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 . The probability mass at any 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 is expressed as an additional logit
term,
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′

𝑒𝑒 𝛼𝛼 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 )
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 ) ≡ W(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 |α) =
,
∑𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒 𝛼𝛼′ 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠 )

(8)

where 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 ) is a vector-valued function of 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 defining the shape of the mixing distribution and 𝛼𝛼
is a corresponding vector of probability mass coefficients. 2 The summation in the denominator

of the additional logit terms assures that the probabilities sum to one (Train, 2016).
The unconditional choice probability of the sequence of choices of individual i is then:
′

𝐾𝐾

𝑒𝑒 𝛼𝛼 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 )
𝑒𝑒 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (𝛼𝛼) = � W(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 |α) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 ) = � �
�
∙
��
�,
𝛼𝛼′ 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠 )
∑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑒𝑒 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟∈𝑆𝑆
𝑟𝑟∈𝑆𝑆 ∑𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒

(9)

𝑘𝑘=1

containing one logit term for the probability that the decision-maker chooses a sequence of
choices and a logit term for the probability that the decision-maker has coefficients 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 , a vector
of marginal WTPs and a discount factor.

Structure can be placed on the type of discounting using the formulas described in section
2.1. This allows us to avoid imposing the unrealistic data requirements necessary for
estimating 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 at any time t. This specification also facilitates hypothesis testing between the

functional forms for discounting (Meyer, 2013a). We estimate D-LML models, including
random discount rate parameters that are flexibly mixed, for each of the four discounting
structures: exponential, Harvey, HM, and quasi-hyperbolic.
Model Estimation Strategy
To estimate the model, the log-likelihood function for α is given by
𝐼𝐼

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �� W(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 |α) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 )�.
𝑖𝑖=1

2

(10)

𝑟𝑟∈𝑆𝑆

Refer to Train (2016) and Caputo et al. (2017) for a thorough discussion of the options for specifying z variables.
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In order to evaluate a sufficiently large and dense S, we simulate the log-likelihood function by
using random draws of 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 for each individual. Letting 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ⊂ 𝑆𝑆 be a subset of R randomly selected
values of 𝜃𝜃, the simulated log-likelihood function is then,
𝐼𝐼

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �� 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 (𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 |α) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 )�,
𝑖𝑖=1

(10

𝑟𝑟∈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖

where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is the logit formula based on subset 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 :

′

𝑒𝑒 𝛼𝛼 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 )
.
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 (𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 |α) =
∑𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒 𝛼𝛼′ 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠 )

1)

(12)

The estimator selects the value of 𝛼𝛼 that maximizes the SLL function.

We use splines in the form 𝛼𝛼 ′ 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃) to flexibly define the mixing distributions. Caputo et

al. (2018b) compared LML models using splines, polynomials, and step functions and observed

that polynomials and splines outperformed step functions in most cases in terms of overall model
fit. 3 In our own modeling analysis, the polynomials required substantially longer estimation
times than splines while offering no clear advantage in terms of model fit or distributional
smoothness. We use a spline specification of z with 8 knots because it produced the smoothest
distributions.4
The support range, S, needs to be defined a-priori, and the extremes of the support range
define the highest and lowest marginal WTP values or time parameter values in the parameter
space. Train (2016) recommended using a range that spans two standard deviations (2SD) on
either side of the mean estimated from a MXL model with normally distributed random
parameters. Caputo et al. (2018b) investigated the sensitivity of LML results to variations in the

Splines, polynomials, and step functions all outperformed a MXL model using normally distributed random
parameters (Caputo et al., 2017).
4
See Caputo et al. (2017) and especially the seminal paper by Train (2016) for a detailed discussion of specifying z
variables for the mixing distribution.
3
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support range and suggested that the researcher can obtain guidance about the optimal range by
visual inspection of the histograms showing the flexible mixing distributions. In particular, the
researcher can extend the upper or lower range limits whenever there is a high probability mass
in the highest and/or lowest bin of the histogram (Caputo et al., 2018b). High probability mass
in the tails of the distribution suggests that some individuals predicted to have parameter values
at the upper (lower) end of the range in fact have larger (smaller) values outside of the
investigated support range (Caputo et al., 2018b). We followed an estimation approach similar
to Caputo et al. (2018b), beginning first by estimating D-MXL models with normally distributed
random parameters. The price/scale parameter, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 , for the D-MXL models was distributed

lognormal. Next, we estimated D-LML models with the support range extending 2SD above and
below the mean parameter estimates. The lower range of the price/scale parameter we set equal
to zero. Then, using visual inspection we extended the upper (lower) range limit any time we
observed a high probability mass in the highest (lowest) bin of the histogram. The lower range
of the price/scale parameter remained set to zero.
We include alternative-specific constants (ASCs) in our models that represent labeled
choice alternatives different from the reference status quo. We estimate models with covariance
in the marginal WTPs due to the probability of correlated WTPs. The D-LML model accounts
for scale heterogeneity, since each utility coefficient includes 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 (Hess and Train, 2017). 5 The

results we believe are the best come from the D-LML models obtained using visual inspection to
guide the choice of supports. The D-MXL results and the D-LML results obtained using the

When utility parameters are uncorrelated in a model, variation in λi can reflect whatever sources of correlation may
be present beyond scale heterogeneity (Hess and Train, 2017). Although our model estimates covariance between
the marginal WTPs, we do assume the time parameter to be uncorrelated with WTPs in the model, and variation in
λi may reflect sources of correlation between the WTPs and the discount rate.

5
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2SD decision rule are in Appendix A. All model estimates come from MATLAB (version
2019a) using 1000 Halton draws.
Experimental design and questionnaire
For eliciting groundwater and time preferences, we chose to conduct a CE involving
MRVA outcomes. Respondents choose among three groundwater management policy
alternatives, including a surface water infrastructure (SWI) alternative, a cap and trade (C/T)
alternative, and a status quo (SQ) alternative involving no change to current MRVA groundwater
management. There is little information available about people’s preferences for a C/T
groundwater permits marketplace because it is not an alternative currently receiving widespread
consideration. However, stated preference methods are a valuable way to elicit preferences for
new goods and services, so we chose to include it here to provide some evidence for
consideration in the MRVA context. Initiatives to expand surface water infrastructure are
currently promoted within several critical areas of the MRVA along with other best management
practices (BMPs). We include the alternative focused on additional infrastructure to offer
another alternative different from the SQ alternative that is grounded within current policy
frameworks operating in the MRVA. Information about each alternative is clearly provided to
survey respondents, and each respondent must successfully answer comprehension questions
about each alternative before advancing in the survey.
We conducted a focus group to determine the most appropriate attributes for the CE
design, collecting information about the socio-environmental services people value from MRVA
groundwater. Focus group participants also reviewed survey questionnaire sections related to the
MRVA and potential policy alternatives, discussing clarity, comprehension, and difficulty. This
feedback, together with existing conceptual frameworks for groundwater valuation (NRC, 1997),
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guide the selection of the CE attributes. There are five main groundwater services, or attributes,
that we identify contributing to the MRVA’s TEV. These are water quality for irrigated
agriculture, the provision of jobs in the agricultural economy, the provision of habitat for
maintaining wildlife, especially fish and waterfowl for local tourism, the avoidance of
subsidence and its associated infrastructure costs, and the certainty of adequate water supply in
case of drought (buffer). We rely on existing hydrologic (Clark et al., 2013) and economic
(Kovacs et al., 2015) simulation models to help in setting realistic attribute levels for the SQ
alternative. The attributes and levels in our CE are shown in Table 1.
We express all attribute levels as percentage values in order to lessen the difficulty of
comparing alternatives across multiple attributes. 6 Levels indicate outcomes for the year 2050
and appear in terms of a percentage of current levels, so that 100% indicates no change from
current levels. We include a cost attribute using an increase to state income taxes for the
household as the payment mechanism.
To identify time preferences, we employ a split-sample design and vary the timing of the
expenses associated with the cost attribute. Respondents are randomly assigned to specific
treatments for the cost attribute that include perpetual annual payments beginning in the current
tax year, perpetual annual payments beginning in the following tax year, a single lump payment
for the current tax year, and a single lump payment for the following tax year. By varying the
onset and duration of the payment mechanism in the choice sets, endogenous estimation of the
time preference parameters within the discount factor for the exponential, hyperbolic, and quasihyperbolic functional forms is possible (Meyer, 2013a; 2013b). The range of the lump payment
cost attribute levels is similar to Meyer (2013a; 2013b) and Viscusi et al. (2008). Following

6

Johnston et al. (2016) use this practice in a CE with three alternatives and six environmental attributes.
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Egan et al. (2015), we convert lump payment levels to perpetual payment levels using a 25%
discount rate and rounding to equal-interval dollar amounts in order to present similarly scaled
cost levels across treatments in the absence of known discount rates.
Table 1. Attribute definitions and levels

a
b

Attribute

Definition

Levelsa,b

Buffer Quantity

The percentage of current acres with
adequate groundwater for 5 consecutive
drought years

25%, 40%, 55%, 70%

Water Quality

The percentage of current acres with
adequate groundwater quality for
irrigation

75%, 80%, 85%, 90%

Jobs from Irrigated Agriculture

The percentage of current (120,000)
jobs

80%, 90%, 100%, 110%

Wildlife Diversity and
Abundance

The percentage of current wildlife
diversity and abundance

75%, 80%, 85%, 90%

Infrastructure Integrity

The percentage of current infrastructure
integrity

75%, 80%, 85%, 90%

Cost to Household (lump)

The one-time dollar increase in state
income taxes

$0, $30, $90, $150, $210, $270

Cost to Household (perpetual)

The permanent dollar increase in state
income taxes

$0, $12, $24, $36, $48, $60

The status quo levels are indicated in bold.
Levels indicate outcomes for the year 2050 and 100% indicates no change from current levels.
We used a three-stage sequential Bayesian approach to construct the experimental design

(Bliemer et al., 2008; Scarpa et al., 2007; Scarpa and Rose, 2008). Using the software Ngene
and uninformative priors, we constructed an efficient design for use in a pilot survey (Bliemer et
al., 2008). Parameter priors from the pilot study (n=203) then updated a Bayesian efficient
design (Scarpa and Rose, 2008). We selected a design with 30 choice sets to achieve attribute
level balance and grouped these into six blocks to reduce the number of choice sets each
respondent must complete. With six block groups, respondents answer five choice sets each.
The levels for the SQ alternative, including no additional household cost, are constant throughout
the experimental design. Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set.
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Figure 1. Example choice task
Growing literatures suggest that stated preference survey designs should account for
known biases in stated preferences that can occur due to low perceived consequentiality (e.g.,
Vossler et al., 2012; Vossler and Watson, 2013; Zawojska et al., 2015) and hypothetical bias
(e.g., List and Gallet, 2001; Lusk and Schroeder, 2004). We use recommended best practices
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intended to potentially reduce these known biases. By including text to enhance the perceived
consequentiality of survey responses with respect to potential policy outcomes, field experiments
show that respondents put more effort into providing truthful responses (Vossler et al., 2012;
Zawojska et al., 2015). A “cheap talk” script that reminds respondents about the constraints of
their household budget can be an effective means to reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings and
Taylor, 1999). We employ these design elements to limit bias in our stated preference data. 7
The survey questionnaire begins with a brief overview and questions to collect
information about topic familiarity and perception of water resources, environment, and society.
Using language to augment the perceived consequentiality of the study (Vossler et al., 2012),
respondents read that their groundwater management preferences from the survey will be shared
with the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission and other stakeholders and might affect how
Arkansas actually manages its groundwater resources. Specifically, respondents read that their
responses could be used as advice on whether to implement new groundwater management
policies, and that the likelihood that a particular alternative occurs could increase with the
number of “yes” votes for that alternative. Respondents also read a bulleted list of information
discussing aquifers, socio-environmental services from the MRVA, and MRVA groundwater
availability and management. This section includes a map depicting the current depth to MRVA
groundwater across eastern Arkansas.
Before completing the choice sets for the CE, respondents read that they will make a
series of hypothetical voting decisions between two policy alternatives for managing
groundwater resources and a SQ option representing no change to groundwater management

7

See Appendix A for the precise language used in the consequentiality and cheap talk scripts of the CE instrument.
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policy. The respondents also see detailed descriptions about the SQ, SWI, and C/T alternatives. 8
Instructions that follow describe the attributes and the payment mechanism in the choice sets. To
construct a groundwater scenario with realistic long-term dynamics, attribute levels presented for
each alternative represent projections for the year 2050, and levels for the SQ alternative capture
the evolving state of groundwater resources if no policy change occurs. Respondents read that
the rate of decline (or change) from the current (100%) levels to the 2050 levels is steady over
the approximately 30-year time horizon, and the levels in 2050 then remain constant into the
future. This language is to minimize confounding factors by establishing a common reference
point for all respondents. Each must confirm that they understand the timing of the payment
mechanism, read the consequentiality language again, and view an example choice set. In
addition, just prior to beginning the actual choice sets, we employ a “cheap talk” script to reduce
hypothetical bias (Cummings and Taylor, 1999), and respondents have the option to review the
detailed descriptions about the groundwater management alternatives again.
We randomize the assignment of choice question blocks and the order in which the
choice sets appear in each block. Above each choice set is a reminder that socio-environmental
attribute levels decline steadily and then remain constant into the future. The levels of the SQ
alternative are fixed, so we place it always in the left most column of the choice set table to make
it easy for respondents to compare alternatives across multiple sets. However, we randomize the
placement of the columns for the SWI and C/T alternatives to avoid any ordering effects.
Following the choice tasks, we ask respondents how difficult the policy choice sets are to
understand and how certain they are about their choices, as well as their opinions about whether
the management policy alternatives are realistic and feasible. We measure stated ANA by asking
For reminder, these abbreviate the status quo, surface water infrastructure, and cap and trade alternatives,
respectively.

8

62

if respondents never ignored, sometimes ignored, or always ignored each of the respective
attributes. We then measure the extent to which respondents believe their choices and those
made by other survey respondents are going to receive consideration by Arkansas policy makers,
a measure of perceived consequentiality. The survey concludes with questions about sociodemographic information.
Survey Sample and Data
This study elicits preferences for long-term groundwater management policies
implemented at the state level. We concentrate on sampling voting-aged residents of Arkansas,
where the dominant portion of the MRVA is located and the most groundwater use occurs.
Between August 27th and October 17th of 2018, we administered a stated preference survey
regarding long-term MRVA groundwater management and outcomes using the survey research
firm, Qualtrics. Approximately 800 adult residents of Arkansas voluntarily accessed the four
versions of the internet-based survey from proprietary research panels and other internet
sources. 9 The survey is designed to be compatible with both traditional and mobile internet
platforms. Individuals receive financial incentive for participating in Qualtrics surveys.
Qualtrics filters responses for quality to remove duplicates from a single individual or any
observation with a total response time less than one-third the median total response time.
Incomplete responses are dropped from the analysis, leaving 777 usable survey responses and
data for 11,655 choice occasions (each person sees five choice sets, and each choice set includes
three choice occasions because there are three alternatives for each choice set). Table 2
summarizes the choice selections by alternative and treatment.

The treatments used in this paper are part of a larger project that includes more treatments for other research
questions. Details of the full experiment can be found on the American Economic Association’s registry for
randomized controlled trials (RCT ID: AEARCTR-0003247).
9
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Overall, the sample is a close representation of the target population. Relative to the
general population of Arkansas residents, our sample shares characteristics for median income
and unemployment rate while being slightly older (median age 42 compared to 38), more female
(66% to 51.5%), and more educated (30.1% with bachelor’s degree to 23.4%) (US Census
Bureau, 2018). 10 Statistics on voters and registered voters in the US suggest that the voting
electorate shares these same biases relative to the general population (File, 2018), supplying
added confidence in the validity of the stated preferences for groundwater policies.
Table 2. Summary of choice selections by treatment
Alternative

Perpetual

Perpetual delayed

SWI
C/T
SQ

373
266
296

358
319
313

Lump
381
290
304

Lump delayed
343
286
356

The spatial distribution of the sample (based on self-reported Zip Codes) also closely
represents Arkansas’s actual population density. Comparing sample proportions across
Arkansas’s 75 counties to the Census population proportions via the Mann-Whitney test shows
no significant difference (p-value=0.259). Most respondents (89%) indicated some degree of
belief that their responses would be given consideration by Arkansas policy makers. The
perceived feasibility of the policy alternatives has a five-point scale where one represents “very
unrealistic and infeasible” and five represents “very realistic and feasible.” The mean feasibility
score of the SWI alternative is 3.43 with just 6.3% who find it very unrealistic and infeasible.
On the other hand, 17.1% find it very realistic and feasible. For the C/T alternative, the mean
feasibility score is 3.29. A slightly larger percentage (7.9%) find it very unrealistic and

10

A table with summary statistics of overall sample demographics is provided in Appendix A.
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infeasible when compared to the SWI alternative. Similarly, a smaller percentage (14.9%) find
the C/T alternative to be very realistic and feasible.
Respondents were randomly assigned to treatments which varied the timing of the cost
attribute. We find balance in observable demographic characteristics across the treatments using
one-way ANOVA (means) and the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test (proportions) (see Table 3).
The treatments also exhibit no significant differences in terms of perceived consequentiality,
question difficulty, answer certainty, or perceived feasibility of alternatives. 11
Table 3. Summary of demographic statistics and treatment sample balance
Characteristic

Perpetual

N
Age, mean
Household size,
mean
Household income
$0 - $39,999
$40,000 - $69,999
$70,000 - $99,999
$100,000+
Female
Education
High school or
less
Some college
College graduate
Married
Unemployed

187
45.2

Perpetual
delayed
198
44.3

2.89

2.92

195
44.0

Lump
delayed
197
43.7

2.74

2.89

Lump

46.5%
18.7%
17.1%
17.6%
65.8%

50.5%
19.7%
15.2%
14.6%
65.2%

45.6%
22.6%
15.9%
15.9%
67.2%

41.1%
22.8%
16.8%
19.3%
66.0%

26.2%

31.8%

24.6%

29.9%

44.4%
29.4%
58.8%
4.8%

41.4%
26.8%
60.1%
3.5%

44.6%
30.8%
54.9%
3.6%

36.5%
33.5%
57.4%
5.6%

F, χ²

pvalue

0.74

0.389

0.22

0.643

4.80

0.851

0.19
5.81

0.979
0.445

1.21
1.39

0.750
0.707

Results
Table 4 presents the results of the D-LML models estimated for each of the four
discounting assumptions: exponential discounting (Model I.a), Harvey hyperbolic discounting

Each was measured on a 5-point scale where 1 equals not at all difficult (certain, feasible, or taken into account by
policy makers) and 5 equals very difficult (certain, feasible) or definitely taken into account by policy makers.
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(Model I.b), HM hyperbolic discounting (Model I.c), and QH discounting (Model I.d). The time
parameter estimated depends on the type of discounting assumed. Utility estimates show mean
marginal WTP in net present value (NPV) along with standard deviations for a 1% increase in
marginal groundwater services and for the implementation of alternative groundwater
management policies. We scaled the cost of each alternative to improve estimation, so the
marginal groundwater service valuations in Table 4 reflect tens of dollars. We report bootstrap
standard errors based on bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (CIs) (Appendix A) and use these to
guide our interpretation of model results. Specifically, we interpret the β time parameter in the
QH model to be significant when the bootstrap 95% CIs do not overlap with one, and we
interpret all other estimates to be significant when CIs do not overlap with zero. In the absence
of a proper test for selecting the best performing LML or D-LML models, we follow Caputo et
al. (2018b) and use standard information criteria. A lower Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
value indicates the better fit.
All time parameters are significant in the models. Each of the alternative discounting
models provides a better fit than the standard exponential discounting model (AIC = 7129.6).
Among the two hyperbolic discounting models, HM discounting (AIC = 7012.2) provides a
better fit than Harvey discounting (AIC = 7039.9). However, the QH discounting model (AIC =
7005.9) offers the best overall fit, and β is significant at an estimated value of 0.613. A β
parameter value of one in the QH discounting model represents no departure from exponential
discounting, and as the value of β deviates from one and becomes smaller, present-bias becomes
larger. With QH discounting providing the best overall model fit and β significant, we find
strong evidence for present-bias. Hyperbolic discounting models also support a rejection of the
exponential discounting assumption. For example, the HM discounting case approximates the
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Table 4. Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-LML models in WTP-space (best
supports)
Parameter

I.a (Exp.)

I.b (Harvey)

I.c (HM)

I.d (QH)

ASC1 (C/T)
St. deviation (SD)

1.157 (0.883)
6.823* (0.424)

0.794 (0.795)
5.316* (0.378)

2.050 (0.914)
5.760* (0.443)

1.312 (0.851)
7.440* (0.488)

ASC2 (SWI)
SD

3.845* (0.686)
5.601* (0.334)

2.185 (0.815)
5.092* (0.333)

2.748* (0.864)
5.371* (0.412)

2.956 (0.743)
8.864* (0.668)

Buffer
SD

1.291* (0.365)
1.954* (0.171)

0.262* (0.095)
0.400* (0.045)

0.120* (0.056)
0.253* (0.029)

0.522* (0.385)
2.396* (0.265)

Quality
SD

1.056* (1.099)
5.923* (0.610)

0.314* (0.081)
0.393* (0.038)

0.493* (0.078)
0.428* (0.038)

0.932* (0.659)
3.483* (0.372)

Jobs
SD

0.331* (0.034)
0.189* (0.017)

0.197* (0.002)
0.009* (0.001)

0.164* (0.119)
0.025* (0.002)

0.664* (0.007)
0.036* (0.003)

Infrastructure
SD

-0.768 (1.040)
5.651* (0.523)

0.295* (0.134)
0.663* (0.091)

0.164* (0.119)
0.746* (0.080)

0.605 (1.119)
4.444* (0.616)

Wildlife
SD

1.545* (1.191)
6.643* (0.675)

0.086* (0.020)
0.081* (0.009)

0.088* (0.120)
0.679* (0.080)

0.892* (0.420)
2.206* (0.204)

𝜆𝜆 (scale)
SD

0.700* (0.124)
0.458* (0.079)

1.963* (0.226)
1.265* (0.141)

1.375* (0.205)
1.145* (0.102)

0.120* (0.009)
0.078* (0.006)

r
SD

0.737* (0.049)
0.249* (0.025)

0.626* (0.047)
0.265* (0.024)
1.352* (0.085)
0.439* (0.053)

u
SD

1.728* (0.044)
0.210* (0.023)

w
SD

β

SD
Log L
AIC
N

-3448.8
7129.6
11655

-3403.9
7039.9
11655

-3390.1
7012.2
11655

0.613* (0.042)
0.176* (0.022)
-3377.9
7005.9
11655

Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10. Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts.
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors given in parentheses were obtained using 250 Bootstrap
samples. Bootstrap 95% CIs are shown in Appendix A.
*significant based on 95% CI (tests for β are against 1, all other are against 0)

exponential form as the time parameter, w, approaches zero. We estimate w to be much greater
than zero (1.728) and observe an overall model fit nearly as good as with QH discounting. We
estimate the Harvey time parameter is 𝑢𝑢 = 1.352, which is in line with the value of 1.646

estimated by Lew (2018). Unlike Lew (2018) however, here Harvey discounting improves
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model fit relative to exponential discounting. These results using flexible mixing distributions
are counter to the findings of Meyer (2013a) and Lew (2018) who found no evidence to reject
the exponential discounting assumption when using normally distributed random parameters.
Though it is not our preferred model, we estimate a mean annual exponential discount rate of
73.7%, larger than the 12.8% in Meyer (2013a) but smaller than the 122% in Lew (2018). Both
previous studies used random parameters fit to a normal distribution. 12 Comparing to studies
using CV without random parameters, the exponential discount rate in our study is larger than
the estimates based on all payment schedules in Kovacs and Larson (2008) and Bond et al.
(2009).
Marginal groundwater service valuations vary across the different discounting types as
with model fit, but there are similarities. Each of the D-LML models shows significant and
positive WTP for water quality, groundwater buffer, jobs from agriculture, and wildlife. In both
the exponential and the QH discounting models the WTP for the provision of infrastructure
integrity is not significantly different from zero. Water quality provision has the largest WTP in
each of the three best fitting models (Harvey, HM, and QH) and is third-largest in the
exponential discounting model. Marginal WTP for the C/T groundwater policy alternative is not
significant for any of the models and therefore not preferred over current management,
groundwater services being equal. The WTP for the SWI alternative is not significant in the
preferred QH discounting model or the Harvey hyperbolic discounting model but is significant
and positive in the exponential and HM hyperbolic discounting models. Looking only at the
preferred QH discounting model, people on average will pay $9.32 for a 1% increase in water
quality. Respondents value wildlife services ($8.92) second to water quality followed by jobs

12

Only Meyer estimated a random parameter for the time parameter.

68

from agriculture ($6.64) and groundwater buffer ($5.22). Standard deviations of the marginal
WTPs are all significant, and most are large relative to the mean estimate, meaning some
individuals have negative WTPs. The exception is jobs from agriculture, where the WTP
appears to be less variable in the population and restricted to positive values.
WTPs for groundwater buffer and infrastructure integrity correlate positively with WTP
for the C/T policy alternative (Table 5), while the SWI alternative correlates positively with
wildlife habitat provision. People who like the C/T policy alternative also tend to like having the
groundwater services that buffer agriculture against drought and prevent harm to infrastructure,
and people who like the SWI policy want the groundwater services that provide wildlife, namely
the duck hunting in the Mississippi flyway. The SWI alternative and the C/T alternative
correlate positively with one another, meaning that people who like one policy alternative also
tend to like the other policy alternative. Among marginal groundwater services, WTP for
infrastructure integrity correlates negatively with WTP for jobs from agriculture. People who
dislike the infrastructure integrity service that groundwater provides tend to like the support
groundwater has for jobs in agriculture.
A consistent difference between the magnitudes of the significant WTPs is apparent
across the different discounting types (Table 4). The values in the hyperbolic discounting
models are smaller than either the QH discounting estimates or the exponential discounting
estimates, sometimes by an order of magnitude. Marginal WTPs in the QH discounting model
are also consistently smaller than with exponential discounting. Beyond the consistent
differences in the magnitudes of the WTPs across discounting types, we also observe some small
differences in the relative importance of the groundwater service attributes. These observable
differences across the different discounting types also run counter to the findings in Meyer
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Table 5. Correlations between marginal WTPs in the D-LML models (best supports)
WTPs
(C/T), (SWI)
(C/T), Buffer
(C/T), Quality
(C/T), Jobs
(C/T), Infra
(C/T), Wlife
(SWI), Buffer
(SWI), Quality
(SWI), Jobs
(SWI), Infra
(SWI), Wlife
Buffer, Quality
Buffer, Jobs
Buffer, Infra
Buffer, Wlife
Quality, Jobs
Quality, Infra
Quality, Wlife
Jobs, Infra
Jobs, Wlife
Infra, Wlife

I.d Correlations
0.7148*** (6.6297)
0.5663*** (3.2833)
0.1994
(0.9949)
0.0246
(0.1335)
0.3324* (1.9098)
0.1333
(0.6509)
0.4212** (2.1897)
0.3080
(1.6354)
-0.0901 (-0.4779)
0.4188** (2.3620)
0.3744* (1.8120)
0.1039
(0.4604)
0.0359
(0.1897)
0.0254
(0.1220)
0.1826
(0.8817)
0.0159
(0.0786)
-0.1681 (-0.7689)
-0.0083 (-0.0364)
-0.4152** (-2.1679)
0.0074
(0.0403)
0.0904
(0.3925)

Note: T-statistics are given in parentheses.
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
(2013a) and Lew (2018). Lew (2018) observed almost no differences in the magnitudes or
rankings of marginal utilities across discounting types likely because the lone difference between
models was discounting applied only to the cost term of the utility model. Meyer (2013a) used a
model that discounted costs and benefits but observed only very small differences in the
magnitude of the lone utility estimate across discounting types, potentially due to the absence of
variability in the flow of beneficial services over time. Our models discount costs and benefits,
and we assume a dynamic flow of benefits over a multi-decadal time scale consistent with
aquifer change, potentially explaining some of the differences we observe in the WTPs and
model fit across discounting types. Since hyperbolic discounters weigh benefits less strongly in
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the present than exponential discounters, the lower WTP for hyperbolic discounters suggests that
respondents’ values for groundwater services change over time such that the values are higher in
the present and lower in the future.
Another potential driver of the differences we observe between discounting types is the
flexible mixing distributions. Flexible mixing allows for individual parameter mass distributions
that capture the clustering of individual WTP and time preferences and reveal modes of
preference ‘types’ in the population. Since the hyperbolic and QH discounting models can
approximate the exponential discounting 13, these discounting models can improve overall fit
relative to the exponential discounting form with flexible mixing because they can flexibly allow
some individuals to take on the preferences of an exponential discounter and leave other
individuals to follow hyperbolic discounting. This is an advantage when comparing D-LML
models for evidence of heterogeneity in time preferences.
Histograms depicting the parameter mass distributions demonstrate the above point
visually, and they provide more detail about heterogeneity than the estimated standard deviations
alone. Figure 2 shows histograms for the preferred QH discounting model. Evidence suggests
three modes of time preference, and this multimodality is present with both of the QH time
parameters: the annual exponential discount rate, r, and the additional discounting parameter, β,
indicating the degree of present-bias. The histogram for the discount rate, r, shows a group with
very small annual discount rates close to zero, a second group taking on rates around 40%, and a
third group with discount rates larger than 80%. The histogram for β shows a group of
individuals with extreme present-bias and a β value around 0.3, another group with β values

A β value of 1 approximates exponential discounting for the QH discounting model. A w value of 0 approximates
exponential discounting for the HM hyperbolic discounting model. Harvey hyperbolic discounting approximates
exponential discounting as u approaches infinity.
13
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clustered around 0.5, and a third group with less extreme present-bias and a β value around 0.75.
Some individuals take on β values close to one, approximating exponential discounting. Neither
of the random time parameter histograms resembles a normal distribution.

Figure 2. Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (QH Model I.d)
Histograms reveal important details about the marginal WTPs, even for terms in the
model where the means are not significant. For example, the mean marginal WTP is not
significantly different from zero for either of the policy alternatives, yet histograms reveal
multimodal distributions involving a group of individuals with positive WTP, another group with
negative WTP, and an ambivalent group with WTP near zero. For groundwater buffer, the WTP
distribution is positively skewed, but there is a cluster of individuals with negative WTP. For
jobs, WTPs display two modes with the group of smaller WTPs clustered around $6.20 and the
group of larger WTPs more uniformly distributed across the upper range of the parameter space.
The histogram for wildlife shows larger densities near the extreme values, suggesting many
people either value the service highly or else clearly oppose investments to improve wildlife
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services, but WTPs are distributed more uniformly in the middle values of the parameter space.
The histogram for water quality is relatively smooth across the parameter space, though it too
reveals a group with negative WTPs despite the greater density for positive WTP values. The
only histogram that resembles a normal distribution is for infrastructure integrity. The density
centers on positive WTP values, but a slight negative skew contributes to the lack of significance
we observe in the mean WTP.
Sensitivity to perceived consequentiality and ANA
Hypothetical CE studies are subject to known biases resulting from respondents having
low perceived consequentiality for the study and their choices (Vossler et al., 2012; Zawojska et
al., 2015) and because respondents often use simplifying heuristics, such as attribute nonattendance (ANA), that lead to ignoring one or more attributes when making choices (Scarpa et
al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2012; Mariel et al., 2013; Caputo et al., 2018a). We examine the
robustness of the preferred model estimates (QH discounting) to these potentially non-trivial
biases by estimating models (Table 6) that account for high levels of perceived consequentiality
(Model II.a) and low levels of stated ANA (Model II.b) through interaction terms. We assign a
dummy for high perceived consequentiality to respondents who answered 4 or 5 on the 5-point
Likert scale when asked about the extent to which they believe their choices and those made by
other survey respondents are going to receive consideration by Arkansas policy makers. We
assign a dummy for low ANA to respondents who always selected “never ignored” when asked
about their attention to each of the attributes in the choice questions. To inform the parameter
supports for the interaction terms in the D-LML, we first estimate models without interaction
terms using only subsets of the sample who received the dummy assignments, and we compare

73

Table 6. Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-LML sensitivity models with QH
discounting and interactions terms for high levels of perceived consequentiality and low levels of
ANA
Parameter
ASC1 (C/T)
St. deviation (SD)
ASC2 (SWI)
SD
Buffer
SD
Quality
SD
Jobs
SD
Infrastructure
SD
Wildlife
SD
𝜆𝜆 (scale)
SD
ASC1 (C/T) x Consequential/Attendant
St. deviation (SD)
ASC2 (SWI) x Consequential/Attendant
SD
Buffer x Consequential/Attendant
SD
Quality x Consequential/Attendant
SD
Jobs x Consequential/Attendant
SD
Infrastructure x Consequential/Attendant
SD
Wildlife x Consequential/Attendant
SD
r
SD
β
SD
r x Consequential/Attendant
SD
β x Consequential/Attendant
SD
Log L
AIC
N

II.a (Consequentiality)
1.0382 (0.9486)
7.1827* (0.5391)
2.7822 (0.9978)
9.1822* (0.7166)
0.3135* (0.3860)
1.9508* (0.2404)
0.8622* (0.7350)
3.5090* (0.3840)
0.6648* (0.0060)
0.0357* (0.0033)
2.3638 (1.1052)
4.6100* (0.5809)
0.4690* (0.4162)
1.8918* (0.2043)
0.1147* (0.0115)
0.0751* (0.0064)
1.2585 (1.1133)
6.0426* (0.5491)
1.3795 (1.4548)
8.1966* (0.7252)
1.2303* (0.4465)
2.3137* (0.1992)
1.5943* (0.5964)
4.0947* (0.3166)
0.6682* (0.0062)
0.0308* (0.0030)
1.5349 (0.9579)
5.9849* (0.5030)
1.1579* (0.3706)
1.9871* (0.1805)
0.5614* (0.0428)
0.1971* (0.0213)
0.6614* (0.0396)
0.2383* (0.0184)
0.0330* (0.0461)
0.2827* (0.0216)
0.0841 (0.0927)
0.4836 (0.0427)
-3277.8
6967.5
11655

II.b (ANA)
0.1347 (0.8941)
8.0965* (0.5437)
1.4457 (0.8687)
9.0047* (0.7607)
0.7871* (0.3955)
2.1396* (0.2239)
3.1976* (0.7857)
4.0614* (0.4179)
0.6689* (0.0061)
0.0313* (0.0031)
1.9300 (0.9097)
5.8067* (0.5334)
0.8170* (0.4456)
1.9979* (0.2151)
0.1150* (0.0110)
0.0717* (0.0062)
-1.1161 (1.0685)
5.3537* (0.5578)
1.6763 (1.5499)
9.0855* (0.8703)
1.7411* (0.4864)
2.8147* (0.2361)
0.6817* (0.6779)
3.7750* (0.3293)
0.6582* (0.0067)
0.0366* (0.0032)
0.1126 (1.1244)
5.3268* (0.5227)
0.5883* (0.3872)
2.0491* (0.1893)
0.6265* (0.0456)
0.2403* (0.0213)
0.6064* (0.0445)
0.2621* (0.0201)
0.0203* (0.0495)
0.2654* (0.0221)
-0.1682 (0.0896)
0.4236 (0.0462)
-3315.1
7042.3
11655

Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10. Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts.
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors given in parentheses were obtained using 250 Bootstrap
samples. Bootstrap 95% CIs are shown in Appendix A. *significant based on 95% CI
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estimates to the preferred D-LML results (Model I.d). Then, with informed interaction supports,
we estimate the D-LML models with dummy interactions. Results show some sensitivity to
perceived consequentiality and ANA, but overall interpretation changes little compared to the
preferred model. In both the consequentiality and the ANA models, significance of the time
parameters remains unchanged and the magnitudes are similar, confirming evidence of presentbias in the population. The interaction term for β is not significant in either the consequentiality
model or the ANA model, meaning those with high perceived consequentiality or low ANA
exhibit no more or less present-bias than others. Interactions for the exponential discount rate, r,
though significant, show that discount rates in both cases are only a few percentage points larger.
As with the preferred model, both sensitivity models show that marginal WTP is positive
and significant for water quality, groundwater buffer, jobs from agriculture, and wildlife, while
infrastructure integrity and the C/T and SWI policy alternatives are not significant. The WTP for
water quality provision is still largest in both cases. Interaction terms show that people with high
perceived consequentiality or low ANA are willing to pay more for each of the valued
groundwater services, though perceived consequentiality exerts the greater influence. Those
with high perceived consequentiality are willing to pay nearly five times as much for
groundwater buffer, nearly three times as much for water quality and wildlife provision, and
almost twice as much for jobs than those with low perceived consequentiality. Based on AIC,
accounting for high perceived consequentiality improves overall model fit relative to the
preferred model, but accounting for low ANA does not. Given these findings, we conclude that
our preferred model results are robust to the biases of perceived consequentiality and ANA.
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Discussion
To learn more about how individuals make intertemporal decisions in non-market
valuation questions, we estimate random time and preference parameters with flexible mixing
distributions for long-term groundwater management using a D-LML model. By allowing
multimodality and asymmetry in the estimated parameter distributions, flexible mixing reveals
valuable detail about preference heterogeneity and discounting behavior. We find three modes
for the annual exponential discount rate, r, in our preferred QH discounting model: two groups
with smaller discount rates near 0% and 40%, and a third group with larger discount rates above
80%. The β time parameter also reveals three groups of discounting types who exhibit
increasing levels of present-bias.
The D-LML enables hyperbolic and QH discounting models to improve fit relative to the
exponential discounting model by representing heterogeneity in the time parameter such that
some individuals can take on values that approximate exponential discounting. Meyer (2013a)
and Lew (2018) failed to reject the assumption of exponential discounting using normally
distributed and fixed time parameters. The only other empirical study to find evidence of
hyperbolic discounting in stated preferences is Viscusi et al. (2008), who estimated time
preferences from WTP for water quality improvements realized over varying time horizons.
Like Lew (2018), we estimate time preferences by varying the payment schedule. And like
Meyer (2013a), we model and discount the flows of both costs and benefits over time.
Estimated WTPs for marginal groundwater services and alternative groundwater
management show that people value the provision of water quality, buffer protection against
long-term drought, provision of habitat that promotes fishing and duck hunting, and jobs from
irrigated agriculture; and they are willing to pay the most to ensure good water quality. This

76

finding could suggest that people associate groundwater quality for irrigation with food safety, as
previous studies find that attributes related to food safety are consistently deemed the most
important in stated preference studies (e.g., Lusk and Briggeman, 2009; Bazzani et al., 2018).
On average, respondents do not prefer new investments for surface water infrastructure or a
groundwater permits marketplace over the SQ management alternative. However, flexible
distributions reveal groups of individuals who possess high values for both new alternatives.
Mean WTP is consistently smaller under hyperbolic discounting assumptions. This suggests that
respondents’ values for groundwater services change over time such that the values are higher in
the present, when hyperbolic discounters weigh benefits less strongly than exponential
discounters, and lower in the future.
Our findings and those from other stated preference studies estimating time preferences
contribute to discussion about the appropriate application of discounting in benefit-cost analyses
for non-market goods. Like most empirical studies, we estimate discount rates much larger than
those commonly used in policy analysis. Compared to Meyer (2013a), who estimated an annual
exponential discount rate of 12.8% using variation in the benefits horizon, we estimate much
higher rates of discounting, including a mean discount rate of 73.7% under exponential
discounting. Our flexible time parameter shows groups of individuals with smaller discount
rates and compares more similarly with CV studies by Kovacs and Larson (2008) and Bond et al.
(2009), who estimated exponential discount rates under varying payment horizons that range
from about 20% to as much as 70%. Lew (2018) estimated a fixed exponential discount rate of
122%, larger even than the upper extreme of the finite D-LML support space that fit our data
best.
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To address concerns that implicit discount rates are implausibly high and disconnected
from actual discount rates due to unserious consideration of the survey instrument or choice
attributes (see Myers et al., 2017), we estimate sensitivity models that account for high levels of
perceived consequentiality and low levels of stated ANA. We find that full attendance to the
choice attributes does not reduce discount rates. Instead, we observe a slightly larger exponential
discount rate under full attendance and no difference in terms of the degree of present-bias.
Accounting for ANA does not improve model fit. Accounting for perceived consequentiality
does improve model fit, but high levels of perceived consequentiality also lead to slightly larger
exponential discount rates and no difference in present-bias. Future research is might examine
the causes for high empirical discount rates.
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III. How Narrative Framing about Climate Change Impacts Preferences for Long-Term
Groundwater Management
Co-authors: Kent Kovacs and Rodolfo Nayga Jr.
Issue framing is a communication strategy that can help individuals form opinions and
process information (e.g., Chong 1993, Druckman 2004, Berinsky and Kinder 2006). Policy
elites, including the media, employ framing using narrative structures and content to
communicate policy relevant information and draw attention to particular dimensions within a
message (Chong and Druckman 2007, Jones and McBeth 2010, Shanahan et al. 2011b). The
messages within competing frames shape the debate surrounding a political controversy. For
instance, research shows that narrative framing applied to climate change policy that focuses on
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions influences the way individuals group terms and
phrases that are prevalent in climate change debates (Jones and Song 2014). However, it is yet
unclear whether the systematic effects of framing on thought patterns still apply to stated policy
preferences. Furthermore, narrative frames about climate change might not have the same
influence when applied to policies that address climate change’s consequences rather than its
causes.
Public policy necessary to combat climate change goes beyond GHG reductions and must
include mitigation of problematic environmental conditions unrelated to the controversial causes
of climate change. New strategies, for instance, are necessary for the long-term management of
water resources in order to mitigate the effects of worsening drought caused by climate change
(Schaible and Aillery 2017). The need for effective policies to address a range of climate change
consequences makes it important to better understand framing effects in these contexts. In the
case of managing water resources, the prevalence of collaborative governance (e.g., Lubell et al.
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2002, Lubell 2005, Leach and Sabatier 2005, Koontz and Newig 2014) could mean that framing
effects are especially critical for effectively communicating policy information, gaining support,
and changing behaviour. Formalization of the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (Jones and
McBeth 2010, Shanahan et al. 2011a, McBeth et al. 2014) has facilitated systematic inquiry into
the role of narrative framing in public policy. Narrative analysis has demonstrated an iterative
process through which different environmental narratives become problematized reflections of
one another as each attempts to dictate governance, leading to polarization within a policy subsystem (Warner 2019). The desire to avoid this process makes understanding systematic
narrative influences important.
Cultural cognition helps generally to explain public disagreement about the significance
of empirical evidence (Kahan et al. 2006, Kahan et al. 2011). The motivated-reasoning model
suggests that individuals credit evidence that aligns with one’s worldview while dismissing that
which challenges held values (e.g., Kunda 1990, Lodge and Taber 2005, Taber and Lodge 2006).
Cultural Theory (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Thompson et al. 1990) – a theory about the
cultural cognition of risk perception – posits that individuals largely fall into four typologies of
cultural cognition (individualist, hierarchical, egalitarian, and fatalist) and that individuals form
perceptions that reinforce these worldviews. For example, individuals with relatively
individualistic worldviews will be sceptical of environmental risks because accepting the need to
restrict commerce and industry in order to mitigate environmental risk is incongruent with their
held values. In contrast, these types of policy interventions are congruent with egalitarian views
about the negative impact of commerce and industry, so egalitarians will perceive greater
degrees of environmental risk. Jones and McBeth (2010) suggested that populating structurally
defined narrative components such as characters using Cultural Theory-derived content can
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ensure that researchers imbue structural elements with generalizable meaning. Jones and Song
(2014) used Cultural Theory to anchor the content of stories to a robust theory of human belief
systems that moderates the problem of narrative relativity (Derrida 1981, Dodge et al. 2005), and
this facilitated hypothesis tests about framing effects related to narrative congruence and
incongruence with cultural typologies. They generally found that when respondents were
exposed to culturally congruent stories, organizational patterns identified by cluster analysis
were significantly more likely to mirror the story. Few studies, however, investigate whether
similar framing effects occur in the formation of policy preferences, and fewer use narrative
forms and content that facilitate generalizable inference (e.g., McMorris et al., 2018; Zanocco et
al., 2018).
We elicit preferences for social and environmental groundwater services as well as longterm groundwater management policies in the Lower Mississippi River Basin (LMRB) using a
Choice Experiment (CE) survey conducted in Arkansas. The Mississippi River Valley Alluvial
Aquifer (MRVA) serves as the critical water supply for irrigated agriculture in the LMRB, and
current rates of groundwater withdrawal from the MRVA are unsustainable (Konikow 2015).
Climate change threatens to accelerate groundwater shortages because more frequent and intense
droughts (e.g., Rosenberg et al. 1999, 2000, Logan et al. 2010) will diminish natural recharge
and make users more reliant on groundwater (e.g., Whittemore et al. 2015, Meixner et al. 2016).
Koundouri et al. (2012) estimated the value of scientific information about climate change in
regard to groundwater but did not investigate systematic influences on groundwater values. Their
approach obscures the ways that individual perceptions mediate scientific information (e.g., Lord
et al. 1979, Slovic et al. 1991, Slovic 2000, Kahan et al. 2009, Kahan et al. 2011). We estimate
preferences from the elicited stated choice data in Arkansas using mixed logit models (e.g.,

90

Revelt and Train 1998), and we test for systematic influences of framing by exposing some
participants to a structuralist, culturally-biased (individualistic) narrative about climate change.
We do this by randomly assigning respondents to a control group not exposed to the cultural
narrative and to a treated group exposed to the cultural narrative. We identify groundwater
services that appeal to individualists such as those for commerce and industry and services that
appeal to non-individualists such as water quality and wildlife. We then test hypotheses about
(in)congruence using sub-sample analysis dictated by the respondents’ cultural type.
Two other studies investigate whether systematic framing effects occur in the formation
of policy preferences. Zanocco et al. (2018) used a structuralist narrative to measure cultural
influences related to hydraulic fracturing preferences but did not use a choice context
comparable to voting where individuals must make choices among limited options that involve
important tradeoffs. McMorris et al. (2018) measured hydraulic fracturing preferences and
narrative responses employing survey measures modeled in the choice context of a vote. Using a
CE to measure policy preferences and narrative influence, we contribute relevant new findings to
this line of literature because CE data provide direct evidence about heterogeneity in preferences
related to the different attributes of a policy alternative while forcing respondents to make
choices involving important tradeoffs between those attributes. Furthermore, ours is the first
study to examine the influence of narrative frames on policy preferences for mitigating long-term
consequences of climate change, specifically, long-term groundwater depletion.
The following section describes the cultural narrative used in the experiment within the
context of Cultural Theory and structuralist (e.g., Genette 1983, Shanahan et al. 2011a)
understandings about narrative form and content. We then detail our experimental design and
data collection, and we conclude with results and discussion.
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Methods
Cultural narrative about climate change
As previously mentioned, we randomly assigned respondents to two groups: a control
group without exposure to the narrative and a treated group that was provided the narrative frame
about climate change and groundwater before the choice questions. We derived the content of
our narrative using Cultural Theory – developed by Mary Douglas (1974) and Aaron Wildavsky
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) – which measures belief systems along two dimensions known as
grid and group (Thompson et al. 1990). The group dimension measures preferred levels of group
interaction, while grid measures the degree to which these groups constrain beliefs and behaviour
(Thompson et al. 1990). Oriented orthogonally, these dimensions define four cultural types
possessing distinct views about nature. Hierarchs (high grid, high group) see nature as
precariously balanced and requiring skilled managers and experts to maintain stability and avoid
calamity. Individualists (low grid, low group) view nature as extremely resilient and able to
return to equilibrium as long as events run their natural course. Egalitarians (low grid, high
group) view nature as dangerously fragile and susceptible to human activities that could destroy
the environment if not undertaken with caution. Finally, fatalists (high grid, low group) see
nature as a capricious and random thing and believe that good and bad things will happen no
matter what they do (Jones and Song 2014).
Previous research has identified prevalent cultural stories in public discourse that relate to
climate change and unique Cultural Theory types (Ney and Thompson 2000, Verweij et al.
2006). Jones and Song (2014) used these stories to construct experimental treatments for
egalitarian, hierarchical, and individualistic cultural narratives. They described three Cultural
Theory stories: Profligacy: An Egalitarian Story, Lack of Global Planning: A Hierarchical Story,
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and Business as Usual: An Individualistic Story. Each narrative followed the form specified in
the NPF (Jones and McBeth 2010), with a setting, plot, characters, and a policy solution (moral).
They populated these structural elements with content from the three Cultural Theory stories.
The fatalistic narrative frame has largely been excluded from past studies of CT on the grounds
that “...the fatalistic solidarity does not motivate people to participate consistently in public
debates” (Verweij et al., 2006: 822, as cited in Jones and Song 2014). This exclusion from past
studies makes it difficult to assess congruence and incongruence for the fatalist group. In line
with previous studies, we omit the fatalist group from our analysis of CT variants. We use the
individualistic story from Jones and Song (2014) as a model for the narrative frame in our CE
survey.
In the individualistic story, the heroic characters are groups like the Cato Institute (a
Libertarian think tank) and Wall Street Journal (a business-focused news publication) because
they reflect principles consistent with individual liberty and free-market economics. The
sentiment is that naïve idealists and self-interested government representatives have fabricated
the issue of climate change. Furthermore, if individualists must concede that climate change is a
problem, then the only solution would be to allow market forces to move forward, believing that
if individuals compete and innovate, new technologies will allow for adaptation. The moral of
the individualistic story is that markets should operate with limited interference. Therefore,
individualists are likely to be more sympathetic to market-oriented solutions.
The individualistic narrative frame used in our CE survey contains five paragraphs (see
Appendix for the complete narrative text). The first paragraph establishes the setting, describing
that groundwater levels are declining, and that resource depletion threatens current economic and
environmental services supported by groundwater. It describes the likelihood for more frequent
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and severe drought due to climate change that threatens to make the problem worse. The second
paragraph establishes a negative (from an individualistic perspective) plot and characters that
comport with the egalitarian cultural type and casts their proposed policy solutions as destructive
and hindering progress toward sustainable groundwater management. The third paragraph
counters the second and introduces an individualistic plot about groundwater and climate change
wherein radical environmental types are using facts about groundwater scarcity and climate
change to push a destructive agenda. This paragraph argues that a policy solution involving the
trade of marketable groundwater extraction permits is the best and most efficient way to generate
groundwater conservation because it relies on free competition. Heroic (from an individualistic
perspective) characters such as the Cato Institute are said to advocate this solution.
The fourth paragraph describes the policy solution as a groundwater permits market,
including the nature of tradeable pumping rights and the competition to reduce pumping. This
describes the market-oriented policy solution commonly referred to as Cap-and-Trade (C/T).
With C/T, the amount of water pumped from an aquifer is set according to the guidelines on
permits available to groundwater users who can only pump if they have a permit. Users are free
to buy and sell permits, and competition ensures that the allowable groundwater pumping is
efficiently allocated via the free market. The cap component of C/T may frustrate the
individualist, but the trading element should appeal to the individualist type. The fifth paragraph
summarizes the individualistic rationale and re-emphasizes support for the market-based policy
solution.
The motivated-reasoning model suggests predictable responses to our narrative frame
stimulus. Narratives draw attention to specific structures (e.g., characters and morals) which we
imbue with meaning from Cultural Theory. Elements within these structures generate cultural
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identifications (e.g., affect from hero characters) that allow individuals to quickly evaluate
congruence or incongruence (Jones and Song 2014). Like Jones and Song (2014), we expect to
observe two situations in our experiment. First, when an individualist encounters the
individualistic narrative frame that is congruent to their held values, we predict these respondents
will filter the story favourably and allow its congruent content to inform their groundwater and
policy preferences. In particular, we predict that individualists who encounter our narrative
frame will have a higher preference for a market-based groundwater policy alternative (Table 1).
On the other hand, when other Cultural Theory types encounter the incongruent individualistic
narrative frame, we predict these respondents will either: 1) ignore the story, or 2) assimilate the
information to strengthen their pre-existing beliefs and preferences rather than those supported in
the narrative. We expect that egalitarians and hierarchs will have less preference for a marketbased policy alternative and could demonstrate greater preference for an alternative policy, such
as the more egalitarian policy alternative characterized by subsidized surface-water infrastructure
(SWI) projects. The SWI alternative is potentially egalitarian because an egalitarian perspective
on the groundwater overdraft problem is that individuals have the tendency to overconsume nonrenewable, common-pool resources. An egalitarian solution is then to address groundwater
overdraft by replacing society’s use of a non-renewable resource with a more renewable resource
such as surface water.
We predict in the case of marginal preferences for groundwater services that the framing
effect among individualists will reflect increased preference for services related to commerce and
industry (e.g., jobs from irrigated agriculture) and potentially lower preference for other social
and environmental services (Table 2). Non-individualists, conversely, are likely to respond to
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the individualistic narrative elements with diminished preference for commerce-related services
and greater preference for the other social and environmental services.
Table 1. Predicted Influence of the Individualist Narrative Frame on Policy Preferences
CT Variant
Egalitarian

Hierarch

Individualist

Hypothesis – Narrative Influence
No change or lower preference for market-based alternative.
No change or greater preference for subsidized surface water
infrastructure alternative
No change or lower preference for market-based alternative.
No change or greater preference for subsidized surface water
infrastructure alternative
Greater preference for market-based alternative.
No change or lower preference for subsidized surface water
infrastructure alternative

Table 2. Predicted Influence of the Individualist Narrative Frame on Marginal Groundwater
Preferences
CT Variant
Egalitarian

Hierarch

Individualist

Hypothesis – Narrative Influence
No change or lower preference for groundwater services related to
commerce and industry (jobs from agriculture).
No change or greater preference for social and environmental services
(buffer, water quality, wildlife habitat, infrastructure integrity).
No change or lower preference for groundwater services related to
commerce and industry (jobs from agriculture).
No change or greater preference for social and environmental services
(buffer, water quality, wildlife habitat, infrastructure integrity).
Greater preference for groundwater services related to commerce and
industry: jobs from agriculture.
No change or lower preference for social and environmental services
(buffer, water quality, wildlife habitat, infrastructure integrity)

Choice experiment design
We chose to elicit groundwater preferences of Arkansas residents by conducting a CE
survey involving outcomes of the Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVA) in the
LMRB, specifically, in the Delta region of eastern Arkansas. Respondents choose among three
alternatives for groundwater management, including a surface water infrastructure (SWI)
alternative, a cap-and-trade (C/T) alternative, and a status quo (SQ) alternative involving no
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change to current MRVA groundwater management in Arkansas. Information about each
alternative is available to survey respondents, and each respondent must successfully answer
comprehension questions about each alternative before advancing in the survey.
We first conducted a focus group to help determine the groundwater service attributes
most appropriate for the CE design. This feedback, together with existing conceptual
frameworks for groundwater valuation (NRC 1997), guided the selection of the CE attributes.
We identified five main groundwater services, or attributes. These are water quality for irrigated
agriculture, the provision of jobs in the agricultural economy, the provision of habitat for
maintaining wildlife, especially fish and waterfowl for local tourism, the avoidance of
subsidence and its associated infrastructure costs, and the certainty of adequate water supply in
case of drought (buffer).
Attribute levels indicate MRVA outcomes for the year 2050 and appear in terms of a
percentage of current levels, so that 100% indicates no change from current levels. We use
percentage values in order to moderate the difficulty of comparing alternatives across multiple
attributes. Johnston et al. (2016) use this practice in a CE with three alternatives and six
environmental attributes. To construct a groundwater scenario with realistic long-term
dynamics, attribute levels presented for each alternative represent projections for the year 2050,
and levels for the SQ alternative capture the evolving state of groundwater resources if no policy
change occurs. We rely on existing hydrologic (Clark et al. 2013) and economic (Kovacs et al.
2015) simulation models to help in setting realistic attribute levels for the SQ alternative. We
include a cost attribute using an increase to state income taxes for the household as the payment
mechanism. For the purposes of a complementary study, a split-sample design varied the timing,
duration, and magnitude of expenses associated with the cost attribute (details available on the
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American Economic Association’s registry for randomized controlled trials, RCT ID:
AEARCTR-0003247). We simplify modeling by using present-value costs computed with the
results of a Convex Time Budget (CTB) questionnaire employed in the survey to allow for
estimating time preferences (i.e., discount rate). See Andreoni et al. (2015) for a description of
the CTB approach. The attributes and levels in our CE are in Table 3.
We used a three-stage sequential Bayesian approach to construct the experimental design
(Scarpa et al. 2007, Bliemer et al. 2008, Scarpa and Rose 2008). Using the software Ngene and
uninformative priors, we constructed an efficient design for use in a pilot survey (Bliemer et al.
2008). Parameter priors from the pilot study (n=203) then updated a Bayesian efficient design
(Scarpa and Rose 2008). We selected a design with 30 choice sets to achieve attribute level
balance and grouped these into blocks to reduce the number of choice sets each respondent must
complete. With six block groups, respondents answer five choice sets each. The levels for the
SQ alternative, including no additional household cost, are constant throughout the experimental
design. Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set.
Table 3. Choice Experiment attribute definitions and levels
Attribute
Buffer Quantity

Definition
The percentage of current acres with
adequate groundwater for 5 consecutive
drought years
The percentage of current acres with
adequate groundwater quality for
irrigation
The percentage of current (120,000)
jobs

Levelsa,b
25%, 40%, 55%, 70%

Wildlife Diversity and
Abundance

The percentage of current wildlife
diversity and abundance

75%, 80%, 85%, 90%

Infrastructure Integrity

The percentage of current infrastructure
integrity

75%, 80%, 85%, 90%

Cost to Household (lump)

The one-time dollar increase in state
income taxes

$0, $30, $90, $150, $210, $270

Water Quality
Jobs from Irrigated Agriculture

75%, 80%, 85%, 90%
80%, 90%, 100%, 110%
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Table 3. (Cont.)
Attribute
Cost to Household (perpetual)
a
b

Definition
The permanent dollar increase in state
income taxes

Levelsa,b
$0, $12, $24, $36, $48, $60

The status quo levels are indicated in bold.
Levels indicate outcomes for the year 2050 and 100% indicates no change from current levels.

Figure 1. Example choice task
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Choice modeling
To model our choice data the utility function for each choice alternative is strictly
additive, and the probability that a respondent chooses a particular alternative is a function of the
alternative’s attributes and levels. A multinomial logit (MNL) specification (McFadden 1974)
models this utility for our data involving three alternatives and six attributes, but the MNL’s
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property restrictively assumes independence
between choice tasks. This is not a realistic assumption for our data. To account for the panel
structure of our data and allow attribute correlation within an unobserved portion of utility across
alternatives and choice situations, we estimate mixed logit models with random parameters,
allowing preferences to vary across individuals (e.g., Revelt and Train 1998, Hensher and
Greene 2003). Results of an MNL model using the pooled data set are included in Appendix B
and were used as starting values for the simulated maximum likelihood estimations of the mixed
logit models. Goodness-of-fit statistics confirm that mixed logit is the preferred model. In
estimating random parameters, we model each as a distribution of individual preference
coefficients with a mean and standard deviation and estimate standard errors for each.
To analyse the discrete choice data using mixed logit, let the utility for an individual n for
alternative j in choice situation t be given by
𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥 ′ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ,

(11)

where 𝑥𝑥 ′ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 represents a vector of alternative-specific groundwater service attribute levels

including benefits and costs, 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 represents a vector of coefficients that are fixed for an individual
across choice situations but vary across individuals, and 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is distributed i.i.d. extreme value

type I.
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Individual n chooses alternative i in choice situation t if 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 > 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 𝑖𝑖.

Conditional on 𝛽𝛽, this probability is the standard logit formula
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 ) =

(2)

exp�𝑥𝑥 ′ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 �
𝐽𝐽
∑𝑗𝑗=1 exp�𝑥𝑥 ′ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 �

.

The conditional probability that individual n chooses a sequence of alternatives (𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛1 , 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2 , … , 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 )

over T choice situations is

exp�𝑥𝑥 ′ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 �
𝐽𝐽
∑𝑗𝑗=1 exp�𝑥𝑥 ′ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 �

𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛 (𝛽𝛽) = ∏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 �

(3)

�.

We integrate out over all values of 𝛽𝛽 to get the unconditional choice probability,
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 = � 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛 (𝛽𝛽)𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.

(4)

The log-likelihood function is then,

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = �

𝑁𝑁

(5)

ln(𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛 (𝛽𝛽)𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑).

𝑛𝑛=1

Given that there is no closed form of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽), the probabilities are approximated through
simulation. The simulated log-likelihood function is defined as
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝛽𝛽) = �

𝑁𝑁

𝑛𝑛=1

1
ln �𝑅𝑅 �

𝑅𝑅

𝑟𝑟=1

��

𝑇𝑇

𝑡𝑡=1

�
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where 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 are random draws from the density 𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽), and R is the number of draws.

We conduct this choice modeling analysis to provide evidence toward two primary

research objectives. First, we ask whether a climate change policy narrative influences cognition
related to policies that seek to mitigate environmental consequences of climate change rather
than alleviate its controversial human causes. To serve this purpose we selected groundwater
policies as the subject of the environmental CE. Second, we ask whether narrative framing
effects are evident with respect to policy preferences (see Table 1) and groundwater service
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preferences (see Table 2) and whether these effects manifest in a systematic and predictable way.
Specifically, we seek evidence of narrative (in)congruence informed by the motivated-reasoning
model and CT. In our CE, we record preferences for two distinct groundwater policies as well as
five groundwater service attributes to enrich evidence about systematic effects.
To facilitate these objectives and formal hypothesis testing, we present two specifications
of the mixed logit: one that includes only main effects and no assumed interactions and another
that includes interaction effects for the individualist cultural narrative. In all models, we include
alternative-specific constants (ASCs) for the two policy alternatives to capture policy preferences
relative to the SQ option. In the first specification we designate all non-price parameters to be
random with a normal distribution. A fixed price parameter permits computation of willingnessto-pay (WTP) while avoiding extreme tails in the WTP distributions that result when dividing
one normal distribution by another. In the specification with interactions, only the main effects
are normally distributed random parameters. Models are estimated in R using the GMNL
package and simulated maximum likelihood with 500 pseudo-random draws (Sarrias and
Daziano 2017).
Data
Our CE survey elicits preferences for long-term groundwater management policies
implemented at the state level. We concentrate on sampling voting-aged residents of Arkansas,
where the dominant portion of the MRVA is located and the most groundwater use occurs.
Between August 27th and October 17th of 2018, we administered the CE survey using the survey
research firm, Qualtrics. In total, 1,966 adult residents of Arkansas voluntarily accessed the
internet-based survey from proprietary research panels and other internet sources. We designed
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the survey to be compatible with both traditional and mobile internet platforms. Individuals
received a financial incentive for participating in the survey.
Growing literatures suggest that stated preference survey designs should account for
known biases in stated preferences that can occur due to low perceived consequentiality (e.g.,
Vossler et al. 2012, Vossler and Watson 2013, Zawojska et al. 2015) and hypothetical bias (e.g.,
List and Gallet 2001, Lusk and Schroeder 2004). We use recommended best practices intended
to potentially reduce these known biases. By including text to enhance the perceived
consequentiality of survey responses with respect to potential policy outcomes, field experiments
show that respondents put more effort into providing truthful responses (Vossler et al. 2012,
Zawojska et al. 2015). A “cheap talk” script that reminds respondents about the constraints of
their household budget can be an effective means to reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings and
Taylor 1999). We employ these design elements to limit bias in our stated preference data.
The survey questionnaire begins with a brief overview and questions to collect
information about topic familiarity and perceptions about water resources, environment, and
society. Using language to augment the perceived consequentiality of the study (Vossler et al.
2012), respondents read that their groundwater management preferences from the survey will be
shared with the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission and other stakeholders and might
affect how Arkansas actually manages its groundwater resources. Specifically, respondents read
that their responses could be used as advice on whether to implement new groundwater
management policies, and that the likelihood that a particular alternative occurs could increase
with the number of “yes” votes for that alternative. Respondents also read a bulleted list of
information discussing aquifers, socio-environmental services from the MRVA, and MRVA
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groundwater availability and management. This section includes a map depicting the current
depth to MRVA groundwater across eastern Arkansas.
Before completing the choice sets for the CE, respondents read that they will make a
series of hypothetical voting decisions between two policy alternatives for managing
groundwater resources and a SQ option representing no change to groundwater management
policy. The respondents also see detailed descriptions about the SQ, SWI, and C/T alternatives.
Instructions that follow describe the attributes and the payment mechanism in the choice sets.
Regarding attribute levels, respondents read that the rate of decline (or change) from the current
(100%) levels to the 2050 levels is steady over the approximately 30-year time horizon, and the
levels in 2050 then remain constant into the future. This language is to minimize confounding
factors by establishing a common reference point for all respondents. Each must confirm that
they understand the timing of the payment mechanism, read the consequentiality language again,
and view an example choice set. In addition, just prior to beginning the actual choice sets, we
employ a “cheap talk” script to reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings and Taylor 1999), and
respondents have the option to review the detailed descriptions about the groundwater
management alternatives again.
We randomize the assignment of question blocks and the order in which the choice sets
appear in each block. Above each choice set is a reminder that socio-environmental attribute
levels decline steadily and then remain constant into the future. The levels of the SQ alternative
are fixed, so we place it always in the left most column of the choice set table to make it easy for
respondents to compare alternatives across multiple sets. However, we randomize the placement
of the columns for the SWI and C/T alternatives to avoid any ordering effects. Respondents
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assigned to the treatment group see an individualist cultural narrative about climate change
following the bulleted groundwater information section of the survey.
Qualtrics filters responses for quality to remove duplicates from a single individual or
any observation with a total response time less than one-third the median total response time.
Incomplete responses are dropped from the analysis, leaving 1,946 usable survey responses and
data for 29,190 choice occasions (each person sees five choice sets, and each choice set includes
three choice occasions because there are three alternatives for each choice set). Of these, 8,790
choice occasions come from the 586 individuals in the treatment group who see an individualist
cultural narrative about climate change, while 20,400 choice occasions come from the 1,360
individuals assigned to the control group. We collected a larger control sample for the purposes
of a complementary study.
The sample overall is similar to the target population of Arkansas residents, sharing
characteristics for median income and unemployment rate while being slightly older (median age
43 compared to 38), more female (65.6% to 51.5%), and more educated (31.7% with bachelor’s
degree to 23.4%) (US Census Bureau 2018). Statistics on voters and registered voters in the US
suggest that the voting electorate shares these same biases relative to the general population (File
2018), supplying added confidence in the validity of the stated policy preferences. We find
balance in observable demographic characteristics between groups of respondents who do and do
not receive the narrative treatment using unpaired t-tests (means) and Chi-squared tests
(proportions) (see Table 4). Though the difference in age is significant at the 10% level, a mean
age difference of less than two years is not likely to influence the results of our CE.
Table 4. Treatment sample balance
Characteristic

No Narrative

Narrative Treatment t, χ²

N

1360

586

p-value
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Table 4. (Cont.)
Characteristic
Age, mean
Household size, mean
Household income
$0 - $39,999
$40,000 - $69,999
$70,000 - $99,999
$100,000+
Female
Education
High school or less
Some college
College graduate
Married
Unemployed

No Narrative
44.1
2.82
46.0%
15.6%
23.2%
15.2%
66.0%
27.9%
41.4%
30.7%
56.4%
4.41%

Narrative Treatment t, χ²
45.4
1.67
2.74
-1.32
2.85
49.0%
13.0%
23.5%
14.5%
64.5%
.357
2.75
28.3%
37.7%
34.0%
53.6%
1.20
6.14%
2.26

p-value
.095
.189
.415

.550
.253

.273
.133

Addressing our research questions requires knowledge about each respondent’s cultural
type. We measure cultural type using twelve CT questions (see Appendix B) – three questions
for each cultural type: individualist, egalitarian, hierarch, and fatalist (e.g., Dake 1991, 1992,
Wildavsky and Dake 1990, Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006, Jones and Song 2014) – which were
administered prior to the choice sets and randomized. Respondents answer each CT question by
placing themselves on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly disagree and 7 is strongly agree.
Factor analysis of the indicators shows that they load on four unique latent dimensions
corresponding to each of the cultural types (see Appendix). We generate factor scores for each
cultural type, and the type with the highest factor score is that respondent’s cultural type. Table
5 summarizes the collected responses by cultural type and the presence or absence of narrative
treatment exposure. A Chi-squared test shows no difference between treatment groups in the
proportional distribution of CT types (p = 0.835). The following section describes the results of
the choice modeling analysis.
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Table 5. Summary of CT type frequencies (proportions) by treatment
CT Type
No Narrative Narrative Treatment
Egalitarian
311 (23%)
135 (23%)
Hierarch
327 (24%)
186 (32%)
Individualist
308 (23%)
130 (22%)
Fatalist
414 (30%)
135 (23%)
Total
1360 (100%)
586 (100%)
Note: Chi-squared test shows no difference between treatment group proportions (p = .835)
Results
Specification I shown in Table 6 presents mixed logit results including only main effects
and no assumed interactions. Model I.a shows the results from the pooled data set. We also
estimate models using subsets defined by CT type. Models I.b (egalitarian), I.c (hierarch), and
I.d (individualist) show the results of sub-sample models for each CT type (sans fatalist). Table
7 presents the models for Specification II where we include interaction effects for the
individualist cultural narrative. For each of the models (a, b, c, and d), we test the hypothesis
that preferences for those exposed to the individualist narrative treatment are equal to
preferences for those not exposed (H0: 𝛽𝛽 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝛽𝛽 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 0). We compute

Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests between the nested models of specification I and specification II
(Table 8).
We reject the null hypothesis for the pooled models (I.a and II.a) at the 10% level and
conclude that specification II is the preferred model. Results for Model II.a indicate significant
and positive mean preferences among the Arkansas population for the SWI policy alternative
(ASC2) as well as for groundwater services associated with buffer value, water quality, jobs
from agriculture, and infrastructure integrity. The parameter for cost is significant and negative,
as theory predicts. Mean preference for the C/T policy alternative (ASC1) is not significantly
different from zero. The standard deviation for each of the random parameters is significant,
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suggesting there is considerable variability in the population with respect to groundwater policy
preferences. Though Model II.a is the preferred pooled model, its interaction terms do not
provide evidence of significant narrative influence on preferences. Accounting for the narrative
interaction significantly improves model fit despite the lack of evident effect in the interaction
terms. In particular, preference for Wildlife services is no longer significant, suggesting that the
positive preference for Wildlife services indicated in Model I.a could be capturing unaccounted
for narrative influence, to some degree. With substantial variability in preferences across the
population and no clear predicted effect, the pooled model may obscure potentially competing
influences (e.g., congruence and incongruence) of the individualist cultural policy narrative
exerted upon different cultural types.
By segmenting the population according to CT type, we can test for the influences of
cultural cognition in response to the individualist narrative frame. The first prediction is that
individualist cultural types will exhibit an influence of cultural congruence with the narrative that
aligns to their own worldview, strengthening related preferences and perhaps weakening others.
Based upon the LR test for the Individualist models (I.d and II.d) we fail to reject the null
hypothesis at any reasonable confidence level and cannot conclude that specification II is
preferred over specification I. As with the pooled data, Individualists exhibit no evidence of
narrative influence and consequently no evidence of cultural congruence. Results of Model I.d
indicate that Individualists show no preference for either policy alternative and value only water
quality among the groundwater service attributes. Preferences vary significantly even among
Individualist cultural types.
The second prediction is that non-individualist cultural types will exhibit the influence of
cultural incongruence in response to the individualist cultural narrative. Results of the LR tests
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Table 6. Results of mixed logit: specification I
Parameter

I.a (pooled)

I.b (egalitarian)

I.c (hierarch)

I.d (individualist)

ASC1 (C/T)
Standard
deviation
(SD)

0.0015
(0.1813)
3.1648*** (0.2449)

1.1714*** (0.3977)
3.2741*** (0.6194)

-0.0677
(0.4190)
3.5999*** (0.6566)

-0.5770
(0.4850)
4.4548*** (0.6824)

ASC2 (SWI)
SD

0.3887** (0.1766)
2.9430*** (0.2682)

1.6696*** (0.3863)
2.9235*** (0.6283)

0.3853
(0.4178)
3.5294*** (0.6185)

-0.0526
(0.4673)
4.2723*** (0.6970)

Buffer
SD

0.0079*** (0.0019)
0.0113*** (0.0033)

0.0061
(0.0042)
0.0241*** (0.0053)

0.0123*** (0.0044)
0.0203* (0.0105)

0.0055
(0.0049)
0.0191*** (0.0069)

Quality
SD

0.0254*** (0.0056)
0.0551*** (0.0111)

0.0187
(0.0121)
0.0813*** (0.0212)

0.0222*
0.0390*

(0.0124)
(0.0219)

0.0515*** (0.0169)
0.1544*** (0.0232)

Jobs
SD

0.0089*** (0.0031)
0.0153** (0.0075)

0.0016
(0.0065)
0.0331*** (0.0106)

0.0130*
0.0334*

(0.0072)
(0.0188)

0.0068
(0.0082)
0.0556*** (0.0113)

Infrastructure
SD

0.0136*** (0.0049)
0.0559*** (0.0086)

0.0244** (0.0098)
0.0524*** (0.0159)

0.0099
(0.0113)
0.0679*** (0.0173)

0.0190
(0.0129)
0.0703*** (0.0231)

Wildlife
SD

0.0095** (0.0048)
0.0373*** (0.0106)

0.0071
(0.0099)
0.0626*** (0.0190)

0.0047
(0.0111)
0.0408*** (0.0155)

0.0138
(0.0130)
0.0624** (0.0286)

-0.0074*** (0.0008)
Cost
-0.0056*** (0.0003)
-0.0069*** (0.0008)
-0.0089*** (0.0010)
Log L
-8835.6
-1940.2
-1972.0
-1886.8
N
29190
6690
7695
6570
AIC
17743.2
3952.4
4016.0
3845.6
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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Table 7. Results of mixed logit with interactions for narrative treatment exposure: specification II
Parameter

II.a (pooled)

II.b (egalitarian)

II.c (hierarch)

II.d (individualist)

ASC1 (C/T)
0.0658
(0.2034)
0.9229* (0.4748)
-0.1236
(0.4730)
-0.4604
(0.5457)
Standard deviation (SD)
2.9537*** (0.2524)
3.3963*** (0.6184)
3.5235*** (0.5956)
4.2716*** (0.6922)
ASC2 (SWI)
0.4760** (0.2018)
1.4948*** (0.4513)
0.4214
(0.4728)
0.1092
(0.5317)
SD
2.9726*** (0.2643)
2.7993*** (0.6390)
3.5864*** (0.5952)
4.2062*** (0.7092)
Buffer
0.0059*** (0.0022)
0.0011
(0.0050)
0.0130** (0.0052)
0.0037
(0.0054)
SD
0.0099*** (0.0028)
0.0249*** (0.0057)
0.0263*** (0.0058)
0.0139** (0.0064)
Quality
0.0230*** (0.0065)
0.0245* (0.0146)
0.0198
(0.0144)
0.0522*** (0.0187)
SD
0.0584*** (0.0103)
0.0855*** (0.0226)
0.0428* (0.0219)
0.1400*** (0.0221)
Jobs
0.0075** (0.0035)
-0.0018
(0.0079)
0.0183** (0.0086)
0.0047
(0.0091)
SD
0.0175*** (0.0050)
0.0376*** (0.0114)
0.0436*** (0.0105)
0.0456*** (0.0133)
Infrastructure
0.0105* (0.0055)
0.0291** (0.0120)
0.0028
(0.0130)
0.0187
(0.0147)
SD
0.0417*** (0.0089)
0.0558*** (0.0158)
0.0695*** (0.0167)
0.0683*** (0.0241)
Wildlife
0.0061
(0.0056)
0.0100
(0.0120)
-0.0137 (0.0127)
0.0069
(0.0145)
SD
0.0452*** (0.0094)
0.0672*** (0.0200)
0.0445*** (0.0173)
0.0597** (0.0261)
ASC1 x Narrative
0.2943
(0.3308)
0.4631
(0.7805)
0.7006
(0.7848)
-0.3452
(0.8909)
ASC2 x Narrative
0.1303
(0.3319)
0.2866
(0.7442)
0.5300
(0.7874)
-0.6083
(0.8851)
Buffer x Narrative
0.0034
(0.0034)
0.0189** (0.0083)
-0.0053
(0.0086)
0.0046
(0.0089)
Quality x Narrative
-0.0009
(0.0101)
-0.0170
(0.0234)
-0.0081
(0.0227)
-0.0025
(0.0296)
Jobs x Narrative
-0.0004
(0.0056)
0.0145
(0.0128)
-0.0268* (0.0139)
0.0067
(0.0150)
Infrastructure x Narrative
0.0048
(0.0085)
-0.0131
(0.0196)
0.0186
(0.0208)
0.0028
(0.0225)
Wildlife x Narrative
0.0088
(0.0087)
-0.0053
(0.0194)
0.0659*** (0.0201)
0.0210
(0.0227)
-0.0077*** (0.0008)
Cost
-0.0056*** (0.0003)
-0.0070*** (0.0008)
-0.0088*** (0.0010)
Log L
-8829.6
-1934.1
-1961.6
-1884.4
N
29190
6690
7695
6570
AIC
17745.2
3954.3
4009.2
3854.8
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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Table 8. Results of Likelihood Ratio tests between specification I and specification II
Hypotheses (H0: 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 0)

χ² (p-value)

Conclusion

Pooled

12.07 (p=0.098)

Reject (at 10%)

Egalitarian

12.18 (p=0.095)

Reject (at 10%)

Hierarch

20.88 (p=0.004)

Reject (at 1%)

Individualist

4.83 (p=0.681)

Fail to reject

show that we reject the null hypotheses for Egalitarians (10% level) and Hierarchs (1% level)
and conclude that specification II is preferred over specification I. This indicates a significant
influence from the cultural narrative on groundwater preferences, and interaction terms provide
evidence for an incongruency effect.
Main effects for Model II.b indicate that Egalitarians exhibit significant positive
preferences for both C/T and SWI policy alternatives and also significantly value water quality
provision and subsidence avoidance (infrastructure integrity). Mean coefficients show greater
preference for the SWI alternative compared to C/T, while standard deviations show SWI
preferences are also less variable than C/T preferences. Model II.c demonstrates that Hierarchs
value jobs from agriculture and (drought) buffer but possess no preference for either of the
proposed policy alternatives. Coefficients for buffer and jobs show mean preferences of similar
magnitude, while individual preferences for jobs vary twice as much as preferences for
groundwater buffer.
The interaction terms in Model II.b (Egalitarians) and Model II.c (Hierarchs) provide
evidence for a cultural incongruency effect due to narrative framing. For example, those
Hierarchs who see the individualist cultural narrative demonstrate significantly lower preference
for the “jobs from agriculture” groundwater service compared to Hierarchs in the control group.
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This comports with our prediction that non-individualist types will show diminished preference
for attributes related to commerce and industry in response to the incongruent individualist
narrative frame. We also predict that these groups will show increased preference for other
groundwater attributes not so directly related to commerce and industry. Model II.c shows that
Hierarchs in the narrative treatment do exhibit significantly greater preference for wildlife
services relative to the control group. All other interaction terms, including those for the ASC’s,
indicate no change in preference in response to the narrative frame, still consistent with the
theorized prediction for incongruence (Table 1 and Table 2).
Similar framing effects indicating incongruency are evident among Egalitarians in Model
II.b. In particular, those exposed to the individualist narrative frame show significantly greater
preference for groundwater buffer. Preference for jobs does not differ from those in the control
group. As with Hierarchs, all other interaction terms indicate no change in preference.
Discussion
This study attempts to build on several weak areas in the literatures relating to
environmental economics, the NPF, and climate change policy. First, consideration for narrative
framing effects is largely absent in the environmental economics literature eliciting stated
preferences for environmental policies. Relating to the NPF, few empirical studies measure
policy preferences in response to generalizable narrative form and content (see McMorris et al.,
2018; Zanocco et al., 2018), and none uses a CE to explore preference heterogeneity or tradeoffs
related to policy attributes. We fill this gap and use a CE to measure policy preferences in
response to a structuralist narrative imbued with content using CT. Finally, there are few studies
about climate change perception that acknowledge the distinction between policies targeting
controversial causes of climate change (e.g., CO2 emissions) and other policies mitigating long112

term consequences. The distinction is important to public policy as governments respond to
climate change. We add to the literature by conducting a CE to estimate public preferences for
long-term groundwater management policies and the groundwater services under threat from
climate change.
We find that egalitarian types and hierarchical types demonstrate evidence of a cultural
incongruency effect in their groundwater preferences in response to an individualist cultural
narrative frame. Hierarchs show strengthened preference for wildlife service provision and
lower preference for the provision of jobs from agriculture. Egalitarians show greater preference
for groundwater buffer. On the other hand, we fail to confirm the hypothesis that individualist
types demonstrate a cultural congruency effect in response to the same narrative frame. This
could be evidence that people respond more strongly to incongruence than to congruence in the
case of groundwater policy preferences. Another possible explanation is that the C/T policy
alternative might not be completely congruent with the individualist worldview. In particular,
the government cap on groundwater pumping that facilitates the C/T permit market could run
counter to individualist preferences, as the status quo essentially allows limitless pumping from
the aquifer. Based on the results of the ASC’s for the two policy preferences, only egalitarians
clearly prefer a new policy to manage groundwater use beyond the status quo, so there is no clear
evidence that individualists prefer a C/T alternative. Another potentially important implication
relates to the findings that hierarch types respond to narrative framing with increased preference
for wildlife services. Because these services support popular fishing and water fowl sports in the
region, hierarch types in particular are perhaps more resolute in valuing the protection of these
services when presented with free-market policy arguments.
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Narrative frames about climate change will continue to influence individuals through the
media, and this research is helpful to policy makers in determining how much, if any, these
narratives affect people’s willingness to pay for mitigation measures. We examine the role of
narratives within preferences for alternative groundwater management due to the drier and hotter
conditions anticipated from climate change. Future studies might consider how narrative
influences willingness to pay for other mitigation measures to cope with the consequences of
climate change. If narrative influences are strong and consistent across different contexts, then
research might find effective ways to counteract, or subdue, that influence toward mitigation
measures that best respond to the demands of climate change.
In addition to building upon research into the NPF, this study is instructive for other
policy frameworks such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (see Sabatier and Weible
2007). By conducting sub-sample analyses for each CT type, we provide informative evidence
toward several components and linkages within the ACF. First, we offer evidence into how
groups of like-minded people (defined by CT type) respond to a cultural narrative in the case of
groundwater policy preferences. Our study is limited, however, in its ability to link the NPF and
ACF using empirical evidence because we sample the general population and not actors within
the policy subsystem. This is a critical shortcoming as relates to the ACF. However, in studying
the general public we do offer evidence into the ACF feedback linkage between system
outcomes (groundwater service levels) and public opinion (public groundwater and policy
preferences), which exerts external force upon the policy subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007).
Future research should sample groups of actors within the groundwater policy subsystem to
provide formal evidence into how the NPF applies to the ACF, and more importantly, policy
change. Sampling farmers, who are the primary groundwater users, is an important next step.
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One of the drawbacks of CEs like ours that measure environmental preferences is the
amount of background information and scenario details that must be communicated to a survey
respondent about a hypothetical future outcome. Though we check that respondents to our CE
read the questionnaire text, it may be that other ways of communicating information would elicit
different responses, and future studies should test this. For example, the ability to communicate
future environmental outcomes in an immersive fashion via Virtual Reality could make those
outcomes more salient and elicit a more sensitive response (see Matthews et al. 2017, Fang et al.
2019). Notwithstanding our study’s limitations, we present some of the first evidence into how
narrative framing about climate change impacts public preferences for groundwater services and
long-term groundwater management policy.
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Conclusion
I presented three empirical studies that address complementary questions related to
groundwater resources management policy through a variety of salient methods for modeling
market and non-market groundwater benefits and costs. Chapter I used a spatially dynamic
economic modeling and optimization framework to examine the limits of groundwater outcome
improvements under new management technologies and policies that leverage market-based
incentives. The results suggest that policies solely targeting economic efficiency are insufficient
to counter trends of long-term aquifer declines. These findings are robust to sensitivity analysis
under a range of parameter values. My results support those from other recent studies arguing
that, in the case of irrigation efficiency, improvements may actually lead to increased
groundwater use rather than conservation (Grafton et al., 2018; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014; Ward and
Pulido-Velazquez, 2008). Notably, I find evidence that improved irrigation efficiency programs
induce farmers in many cases to plant more water-intensive crops such as rice that garner higher
profit margins but lead to increases in water use.
In Chapter II, I integrated existing elements from Meyer (2013a; 2013b) and Train (2016;
Train and Weeks, 2005) into new specifications of choice models to jointly estimate public WTP
for groundwater services and alternative management policies together with endogenous
discount rates using flexible mixing distributions for the random parameters. Marginal WTP
results illuminate significant public WTP for the non-market benefits of water quality provision
and buffer against long-term drought, as well as for the provision of jobs from agriculture and
wildlife habitat provision that promotes fishing and duck hunting. I estimated a mean annual
exponential discount rate of roughly 73%, consistent with literature-wide findings about high
individual discount rates. I leveraged flexible mixing distributions in the estimation of
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endogenous individual time preferences to revisit Meyer’s (2013a) and Lew’s (2018)
comparisons of discounting functional forms using CE data. While Meyer (2013a) and Lew
(2018) found no evidence to reject the exponential model, I find evidence with more flexible
models that most individuals tend to deviate from exponential discounting. Importantly, I find
that the form of discounting assumed could influence estimated net present values in policy
analysis, potentially dictating whether to implement new policy alternatives.
The final chapter examined treatment effects within mixed logit models given exposure
to a culturally-biased narrative frame about climate change. I used theories about cultural risk
perception and motivated reasoning to evaluate systematic effects in response to the
individualistic cultural frame. Findings show that egalitarian and hierarchical types display
evidence of a cultural incongruency effect while individualistic types show no effect. This could
be evidence that people respond more strongly to incongruence than to congruence in the case of
groundwater policy preferences. However, future research is necessary to determine whether a
policy alternative other than C/T might exhibit greater congruence with the individualistic
worldview. Few empirical studies measure policy preferences in response to generalizable
narrative form and content (see McMorris et al., 2018; Zanocco et al., 2018), and none uses a CE
to explore preference heterogeneity or tradeoffs related to policy attributes. I fill this gap by
conducting a CE to measure policy preferences in response to a structuralist narrative imbued
with content using CT. Beyond the empirical value offered for research into the NPF, Chapter
III is instructive for scholars of the ACF. Evidence as to how different types of people (defined
by CT type) respond to a cultural narrative in the case of groundwater policy preferences can
help to explain patterns of behaviour within advocacy coalitions, and future research to sample
relevant actors within the groundwater policy subsystem is warranted.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Appendix A contains supplementary material for Chapter II. This includes the ‘cheap talk’ and
‘consequentiality’ scripts used in the survey instrument to foster incentive compatibility. This
also includes detailed sample demographics (Table A1) to support the general validity of the
study. Tables A2-A5 report the bootstrap 95% confidence intervals used to compute standard
errors for the D-LML models (best supports) in Chapter II. Table A6 presents the simulated
maximum likelihood results of the D-MXL models. Table A7 shows the simulated maximum
likelihood results of the D-LML models using the 2SD decision rule and the D-MXL results to
inform the parameter supports. Figures A1-A4 depict the corresponding marginal WTP and time
parameter distributions for the D-LML models (2SD supports).
Cheap Talk Script in Survey Instrument
For the following questions, ASSUME you are making voting decisions for a state
referendum. In each question, please indicate your preferred alternative given the different
attribute levels and cost.
Be Aware: Studies show that people tend to act differently when they face hypothetical
decisions. In other words, they say one thing and do something different. For example, some
people state a policy they would support at a given cost, but when the policy is actually under
consideration as an election ballot measure, they will not vote for it at the cost they said they
would support. We want you to behave in the same way that you would if you really were
considering an election ballot measure with real tax consequences.
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Consequentiality Script and Comprehension Check in Survey Instrument
We want to know how people think groundwater resources should be managed in the Mississippi
River Valley alluvial aquifer (MRVA). Findings from this survey will be shared with the
Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC) and other stakeholders and might affect how
Arkansas actually manages its groundwater resources. Your responses and those from
other participants will not solely determine the implementation of new groundwater management
policy, but they will be used as advice on whether to implement such policy. The likelihood that
a particular alternative is implemented could increase with the number of "yes" votes for that
alternative.
According to the above paragraph, which of the following is true about your responses on this
survey?
a. Responses will have no impact on groundwater management policy in Arkansas.
b. Responses will be used as advice on whether to implement groundwater management
policy in Arkansas.
c. Responses will be used to completely inform groundwater management policy in
Arkansas.
Sample Demographics
Table A1. Sample demographics and Arkansas population statistics
Characteristic
Median Age
(standard deviation)
Percent Female
(standard error)
Mean persons per household
(standard deviation)
Median household income
-

MRVA Survey Sample
42
(15.31)
66.0
(0.017)
2.86
(1.27)
$ 40,000 - $ 49,000
-

Arkansas
38
51.5
2.53
$ 45,869
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Table A1 (Cont.)
Characteristic
Percent bachelor's degree or higher
(standard error)
Percent married
(standard error)
Percent Unemployed
(standard error)

MRVA Survey Sample
30.1
(0.016)
57.8
(0.018)
4.4
(0.007)

Arkansas
23.4
49.2
5.6

Note: Arkansas population statistics come from the US Census Bureau’s 2017 American
Community Survey.
Bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals
Table A2. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameter and WTP
parameters of Model I.a (D-LML with Exponential discounting)
Parameter
ASC1 (C/T)
ASC2 (SWI)
Buffer
Quality
Jobs
Infrastructure
Wildlife
𝜆𝜆 (scale)
r

Mean (lower)
-1.6382
1.5270
0.2364
0.7605
0.2605
-2.8679
0.7372
0.2765
0.6303

Mean (upper)
2.2772
4.1549
1.6719
4.7971
0.4047
1.2646
5.3826
0.7429
0.8197

St. Deviation (lower)
6.2738
5.4300
1.5468
4.8783
0.1508
4.9685
5.7254
0.2176
0.2123

St. Deviation (upper)
7.9793
6.8591
2.2424
7.3532
0.2193
6.9854
8.3260
0.5078
0.3063

Table A3. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameter and WTP
parameters of Model I.b (D-LML with Harvey hyperbolic discounting)
Parameter
ASC1 (C/T)
ASC2 (SWI)
Buffer
Quality
Jobs
Infrastructure
Wildlife
𝜆𝜆 (scale)
u

Mean (lower)
-2.4100
-0.1939
0.0528
0.1946
0.1911
0.3559
0.0426
1.7204
1.2154

Mean (upper)
0.7562
3.0030
0.4312
0.4928
0.1993
0.8769
0.1224
2.6179
1.5195

St. Deviation (lower)
4.1846
4.5830
0.3314
0.2609
0.0067
0.6657
0.0624
0.9312
0.3133

St. Deviation (upper)
5.7113
5.9466
0.5115
0.4061
0.0111
1.0031
0.1006
1.5302
0.5393
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Table A4. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameter and WTP
parameters of Model I.c (D-LML with HM hyperbolic discounting)
Parameter
ASC1 (C/T)
ASC2 (SWI)
Buffer
Quality
Jobs
Infrastructure
Wildlife
𝜆𝜆 (scale)
w

Mean (lower)
-1.2501
1.3520
0.0394
0.2500
0.1503
0.0158
0.1716
1.1981
1.6302

Mean (upper)
2.3366
4.5694
0.2507
0.5664
0.1693
0.4915
0.6193
2.0149
1.8033

St. Deviation (lower)
5.3628
4.7336
0.2463
0.2934
0.0169
0.5444
0.5705
0.8981
0.1708

St. Deviation (upper)
7.0797
6.3700
0.3604
0.4496
0.0269
0.8343
0.8746
1.3002
0.2598

Table A5. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameters and WTP
parameters of Model I.d (D-LML with QH discounting)
Parameter
ASC1 (C/T)
ASC2 (SWI)
Buffer
Quality
Jobs
Infrastructure
Wildlife
𝜆𝜆 (scale)
r
β

Mean (lower)
-2.0861
-0.0222
0.3749
0.1550
0.6483
-1.9425
0.0685
0.0768
0.4678
0.5881

Mean (upper)
1.2693
2.8903
1.9348
2.7458
0.6743
2.5695
1.6832
0.1159
0.6405
0.7483

St. Deviation (lower)
6.9635
8.6151
1.8013
2.7864
0.0309
3.4595
1.5652
0.0666
0.1866
0.1496

St. Deviation (upper)
8.9172
11.134
2.7945
4.1345
0.0429
5.9618
2.3849
0.0909
0.2774
0.2356

D-MXL Model Results
Table A6. Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-MXL models in WTP-space
Parameter
ASC1 (C/T)
St. deviation (SD)
ASC2 (SWI)
SD
Buffer
SD
Quality
SD
Jobs
SD
Infrastructure

A6.a (Exp.)
-0.0451
(0.0737)
5.1952*** (0.0186)
1.6471*** (0.0801)
4.4645*** (0.0151)
0.6327*** (0.0192)
1.6237*** (0.0180)
0.9968*** (0.0383)
6.4774*** (0.0726)
0.4315*** (0.0220)
0.0073
(0.0058)
-0.8254*** (0.0187)

A6.b (Harvey)
-1.4382*** (0.0465)
4.2721*** (0.0203)
0.9755*** (0.0439)
4.0846*** (0.0160)
0.1057*** (0.0022)
0.4652*** (0.0036)
0.3271*** (0.0042)
0.3463*** (0.0046)
0.1957*** (0.0033)
0.0086*** (0.0009)
-0.1130*** (0.0043)

A6.c (HM)
-1.2639*** (0.0466)
3.9935*** (0.0063)
0.9457*** (0.0485)
4.8280*** (0.0144)
0.0992*** (0.0019)
0.3056*** (0.0019)
0.3246*** (0.0084)
0.3605*** (0.0031)
0.1996*** (0.0029)
0.0033*** (0.0006)
-0.0758*** (0.0051)

A6.d (QH)
-1.0080*** (0.0381)
5.3552*** (0.1049)
0.9208*** (0.0943)
4.3347*** (0.1012)
0.5481*** (0.0715)
1.5920*** (0.0498)
0.8460*** (0.0571)
3.3067*** (0.0972)
0.6964*** (0.0243)
0.0105
(0.0441)
-0.2921*** (0.0611)
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Table A6 (Cont.)
Parameter
SD
Wildlife
SD
𝜆𝜆 (scale)
SD
r
SD
u
SD
w
SD
β
SD
Log L
AIC
N

A6.a (Exp.)
5.3070*** (0.0706)
-0.1556*** (0.0198)
8.3207*** (0.1005)
-1.6396*** (0.2415)
4.8823*** (0.8507)
0.4910*** (0.0054)
0.0005
(0.0014)

A6.b (Harvey)
1.0257*** (0.0075)
0.1041*** (0.0049)
0.0882*** (0.0016)
-1.7174*** (0.2467)
6.0073*** (1.2113)

A6.c (HM)
0.7410*** (0.0086)
0.0894*** (0.0054)
0.7242*** (0.0072)
-1.5832*** (0.1795)
5.8371*** (0.8364)

A6.d (QH)
4.8633*** (0.0327)
0.6078*** (0.1242)
1.8295*** (0.1053)
-1.2233*** (0.3389)
6.7316*** (1.8009)
0.4129*** (0.0093)
0.0051
(0.0044)

1.2054*** (0.0040)
0.0055*** (0.0011)
1.4616*** (0.0160)
0.0031
(0.0079)

-3531.7
7099.4
11655

-3574.6
7185.2
11655

-3562.5
7161.0
11655

0.9951*** (0.0827)
-3541.9
7121.8
11655

Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10. Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts.
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
D-LML Model Results (2SD Supports)
Table A7. Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-LML models in WTP-space (2SD
supports)
Parameter

A7.a (Exp.)

A7.b (Harvey)

A7.c (HM)

A7.d (QH)

ASC1 (C/T)
St. deviation (SD)

-1.0258 (0.9041)
6.3239* (0.3468)

-0.2177* (0.7808)
5.0518* (0.3561)

-0.9943 (0.8121)
4.9056* (0.4146)

-2.5428* (1.2276)
6.6602* (0.6030)

ASC2 (SWI)
SD

1.4193* (0.7850)
6.1815* (0.3065)

1.4020 (0.7892)
5.1448* (0.3665)

0.0886 (0.8424)
5.6457* (0.4321)

1.0325 (1.0438)
5.6879* (0.3334)

Buffer
SD

0.4877* (0.2822)
1.7617* (0.1231)

0.1592 (0.0884)
0.3954* (0.0484)

0.1876* (0.0615)
0.3186* (0.0300)

0.6636 (0.3547)
1.8740* (0.1518)

Quality
SD

0.8684 (1.1443)
6.2084* (0.4524)

0.4081* (0.0867)
0.3630* (0.0361)

0.2347* (0.0779)
0.3835* (0.0373)

0.8460 (0.0571)
3.3067* (0.0972)

Jobs
SD

0.4324* (0.0013)
0.0083* (0.0005)

0.1954* (0.0022)
0.0107* (0.0010)

0.1997* (0.0008)
0.0041* (0.0004)

0.6962* (0.0025)
0.0116* (0.0009)

Infrastructure
SD

-1.0078 (0.9297)
5.8801* (0.3614)

0.3983* (0.1465)
0.8752* (0.0890)

0.3591 (0.1218)
0.7114* (0.0654)

9.7430* (0.0336)
0.1739* (0.0072)

Wildlife
SD

0.4659 (1.4026)
7.6474* (0.5570)

0.1486* (0.0206)
0.0965* (0.0095)

0.2639* (0.1243)
0.8174* (0.0732)

0.0562 (0.4349)
2.1128* (0.1673)

𝜆𝜆 (scale)
SD

3.5899* (1.2635)
2.4406* (0.7499)

2.5254* (0.4330)
1.7964* (0.3284)

2.8248* (0.6604)
3.0019* (0.8514)

0.9390* (0.7408)
1.8130* (0.8128)

r
SD

0.4910* (0.0001)
0.0006* (0.0000)

0.4133* (0.0009)
0.0059* (0.0004)
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Table A7 (Cont.)
Parameter

A7.a (Exp.)

A7.b (Harvey)

A7.c (HM)

1.4613* (0.0007)
0.0034* (0.0003)

w
SD

0.9809 (0.0151)
0.0938* (0.0068)

β
SD
Log L
AIC
N

A7.d (QH)

1.2036* (0.0014)
0.0049* (0.0007)

u
SD

-3648.9
7529.7
11655

-3472.6
7177.2
11655

-3469.2
7170.4
11655

-3876.6
8003.1
11655

Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10. Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts.
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors given in parentheses were obtained using 250 Bootstrap
samples.
*significant based on Bootstrap 95% CI

Figure A1. Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (exponential
model A7.a)
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Figure A2. Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (Harvey model
A7.b)

Figure A3. Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (HM model
A7.c)
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Figure A4. Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (QH model
A7.d)
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Appendix B
Appendix B contains supplementary material for Chapter III. Below is a copy of the
individualistic cultural narrative used in the experiment. I also include here a complete list of the
survey questions used to evaluate each respondent’s cultural type and the results of the Principal
Components analysis (Tables B1and B2) employed in that classification. To support the general
validity of the study, I also share detailed sample demographics (Table B3). Table B4 shows the
multinomial logit (MNL) results that were used as starting values for the mixed logit models
reported in Chapter III.
Individualistic Cultural Narrative about Climate Change
As you can see, groundwater availability in the MRVA is declining, and the resource depletion
threatens the economic and environmental services that are supported by the MRVA. The
prospect of having more severe droughts as a result of climate change threatens to make the
problem worse. It is apparent that sustainable groundwater management in Arkansas is
necessary. However, despite the threats to crucial economic and environmental services, real
progress in achieving sustainable groundwater management has been made nearly impossible by
the efforts of destructive interests.
Environmental advocates, represented by organizations like Greenpeace and the radical
Earth-First!, are attempting to use water scarcity problems and climate change to destroy our
capitalist system. These groups demand radical policies that destroy free competition and reduce
our individual quality of life. These groups put faith in socialized community-owned resources,
invasive laws, and the more dangerous positions advocate diverting and storing water resources
with government-funded projects where authority rests with a central manager. They argue that
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due to the failure of free markets, only planned water resource solutions can be trusted to combat
water scarcity and the problems of climate change.
It is clear that radical environmental types are using the facts about groundwater scarcity
and climate change to push a destructive agenda that obstructs any meaningful solutions to the
problem. To solve this problem we must invoke the value that has always served humans the
best; that value is our historical reliance on free competition. The innovative Cap-and-Trade
solution relies on this value by taking advantage of free competition to generate groundwater
conservation most efficiently and shift pumping patterns toward the most valuable uses of
groundwater. Thankfully organizations like the Cato Institute and Wall Street Journal have been
tirelessly advocating for this solution.
The Cap-and-Trade groundwater market solution reduces the overall amount of
groundwater pumping, as private firms are limited by how much they can pump. Each firm can
buy, sell, or trade unused pumping allocations within the overall pumping limits. So, if a firm
pumps less groundwater than what its permits would allow, it may sell or trade its permits to a
firm that produces more. This solution lets firms that have traditionally used more groundwater
buy from those that use less. The benefit of the Cap-and-Trade solution is that firms will have
time to adapt to a more environmentally-sustainable economy while also competing with firms
that find creative ways to cut costs and reduce groundwater pumping.
The problem of water scarcity, and its potential exacerbation due to climate change,
reminds us all that the world is rapidly changing. When change turns for the worse, it can only
get better if we are free to adapt. The Cap-and-Trade solution provides a clear path for private
firms to freely adapt, innovate, and ultimately achieve sustainable groundwater
management. Radical ideology and socialist environmental solutions are not the answer.
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List of CT Survey Questions
We asked respondents the following in order to evaluate each respondent’s cultural type:
Using a scale from 1 (Disagree) to 7 (Agree), please indicate to what extent you agree with the
following statements.
1. Our society is in trouble because we don’t obey those in authority.
2. The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do.
3. It would be pointless to make serious plans in such an uncertain world.
4. Society works best if power is shared equally.
5. We are all better off when we compete as individuals.
6. Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world.
7. It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income between the rich and the poor.
8. No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces outside our
control.
9. Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on
their own.
10. Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance.
11. What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.
12. Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those that
break the rules.
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Principal Components Analysis
Table B1. Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Measures
Cultural Type
Egalitarian
Hierarch
Individualist
Fatalist

CT Questions
4, 7, and 11
1, 2, and 12
5, 6, and 9
3, 8, and 10

Cronbach’s Alpha
0.77
0.68
0.68
0.69

Table B2. PCA Loadings
CT Question 1
CT Question 2
CT Question 3
CT Question 4
CT Question 5
CT Question 6
CT Question 7
CT Question 8
CT Question 9
CT Question 10
CT Question 11
CT Question 12
SS loadings
Proportion Var
Cumulative Var
Proportion Explained
Cumulative Proportion

RC4
-0.06
0.08
0.1
0.82
-0.11
0.02
0.78
0.25
-0.08
0.25
0.78
0.09
2.05
0.17
0.17
0.27
0.27

RC1
0.16
0.33
0.77
0.1
0.15
0.03
0.22
0.71
0.08
0.72
0.28
-0.08
1.93
0.16
0.33
0.25
0.52

RC2
0.13
0.14
0.11
0.06
0.72
0.76
-0.11
0
0.78
0.17
-0.16
0.27
1.89
0.16
0.49
0.25
0.77

RC3
0.82
0.68
0.17
0.01
0.09
0.2
0.01
0.12
0.2
0.03
0.08
0.72
1.8
0.15
0.64
0.23
1

Sample Demographics
Table B3. Sample demographics and Arkansas population statistics
Characteristic
Median Age
(standard deviation)
Percent Female
(standard error)
Mean persons per household
(standard deviation)
Median household income

MRVA Survey Sample
43
(15.51)
65.6
(0.011)
2.80
(1.27)
$ 40,000 - $ 49,000

Arkansas
38
51.5
2.53
$ 45,869
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Table B3 (Cont.)
Characteristic
Percent bachelor's degree or higher
(standard error)
Percent married
(standard error)
Percent Unemployed
(standard error)

MRVA Survey Sample
31.7
(0.011)
55.5
(0.011)
4.9
(0.005)

Arkansas
23.4
49.2
5.6

Note: Arkansas population statistics come from the US Census Bureau’s 2017 American
Community Survey.
MNL
Table B4. Multinomial logit results using pooled data
Parameter
ASC1 (C/T)
ASC2 (SWI)
Buffer
Quality
Jobs
Infrastructure
Wildlife
Cost
Log L
N
AIC

I.a (pooled)
-0.2741*** (0.1058)
-0.0180
(0.1055)
0.0071*** (0.0013)
0.0111*** (0.0036)
0.0058*** (0.0021)
0.0044
(0.0049)
0.0079** (0.0031)
-0.0039*** (0.0002)
-10476.3
29190
20968.6
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Appendix C
IRB Approval Letter

Figure C1. Copy of Letter
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